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OVERCRIMINALIZING SPEECH
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael †

Recent years have seen a significant expansion in the criminal justice
system’s use of various preemptive measures, aimed to prevent harm before
it occurs. This development consists of adopting a myriad of prophylactic
statutes, including endangerment crimes, which target behaviors that
merely pose a risk of future harm but are not in themselves harmful at the
time they are committed.
This Article demonstrates that a significant portion of these
endangerment crimes criminalize various forms of speech and expression.
Examples include conspiracies, attempts, verbal harassment, instructional
speech on how to commit crimes, and possession crimes. The Article argues
that in contrast with conventional wisdom’s assumption that the right to
free speech is broadly protected under existing jurisprudence, much speech
is currently overcriminalized under the endangerment justification. Free
speech doctrines and criminal law are in tension with one another. While
under its First Amendment jurisprudence the Court contracts government’s
power to ban speech, criminal law constantly expands the scope of speech
crimes.
The Article contends that existing doctrines attempting to explain this
inconsistency fail to provide a principled explanation for the absence of
First Amendment scrutiny from various types of speech crimes. To
ameliorate this problem, this Article proposes a unified analytical
framework for assessing when speech justifies criminalization and when it
warrants constitutional protection. The proposal suggests that all speech
crimes should be subject to constitutional scrutiny under free speech
doctrines, as well as to additional constraints stemming from criminal law
theory. This Article provides several factors to guide the judicial inquiry
into determining the scope of criminal bans on speech.
† Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee School of Law. S.J.D., University
of Virginia School of Law, 2010. My deepest gratitude to A. Benjamin Spencer for his invaluable
comments on several drafts of this Article and for devoting enormous time and effort to
providing me feedback on this piece. I am also grateful to the following scholars for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts: Aaron Caplan, Nora Demleitner, Mark Drumbl, Erik Luna, Timothy
MacDonnell, Ann Massie, Brian Murchison, Doug Rendleman, Larry Solum, and Joan
Shaughnessy. Thank you also to the participants of Washington and Lee’s Faculty Workshop for
their helpful feedback on this Article. All errors and omissions remain mine alone.
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Between the idea
And the reality
Between the motion
And the act
Falls the Shadow . . . . 1

INTRODUCTION
Tarek Mehanna, a twenty-two-year-old Muslim-American citizen,
was living in Massachusetts and studying towards a doctorate degree in
pharmacy. 2 A devoted scholar of Islam, Mehanna began to translate
Arab-language materials into English. He then posted his translations
on al-Tibyan, an Islamic website that comprised an online community
for those sympathetic to al-Qaeda and Jihadi perspectives. Website
members shared opinions, videos, and texts in online forums. The
translated writings, which were already available on the Internet, varied
significantly in their potential link to terrorism, ranging from some alQaeda–generated media and materials supportive of al-Qaeda and/or
jihad, such as instructing readers to “ask God for martyrdom” and to
“Go for Jihad Yourself,” to more innocuous writings loosely tethered to
the jihad movement, such as maintaining physical fitness. 3
In 2009, Mehanna, who had no prior criminal record, was arrested
on terrorism-related charges. 4 The government argued, among others,
that the translated writings provided a service to al-Qaeda, because its
purpose was to spur readers on to jihad and inspire al-Qaeda supporters
to commit terrorist acts. 5 On December 19, 2011, a Massachusetts jury
convicted Mehanna of four terrorism-related charges, including
conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist
organization, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. 6 The district court
sentenced Mehanna to a prison term of 210 months. 7 On November 13,

1 T.S. ELIOT, THE HOLLOW MEN (1925), reprinted in THE COMPLETE POEMS AND PLAYS:
1909–1950, at 56, 58 (1971).
2 United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2013).
3 See MUHAMMAD BIN AHMAD AS-SĀLIM, 39 WAYS TO SERVE AND PARTICIPATE IN JIHĀD
(At-Tibyān Publ’ns trans.), available at https://ia700408.us.archive.org/7/items/39WaysToServe
AndParticipate/39WaysToServeAndParticipateInJihad.pdf (last visited Apr. 14, 2015) (providing
the full-text English language translation of the Arabic document, which is publicly available on
numerous Islamic Internet sites).
4 Mehanna, 735 F.3d at 41.
5 Id. (charges against Mehanna “were based on two separate clusters of activities”: one
centered on his travel to Yemen, in search of an al-Qaeda training camp, the other was
“translation-centric”).
6 Id. at 42.
7 Id.

BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete)

1670

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

6/7/2015 12:27 PM

[Vol. 36:1667

2013, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit upheld Mehanna’s
conviction and sentence. 8
Mehanna’s translation-centered conviction raises some vexing
questions concerning how we distinguish between speech that warrants
criminal prohibition and speech that ought to be protected against
criminal sanctions by the First Amendment. As the case poignantly
illustrates, making this distinction can be difficult. Convicting Mehanna
with conspiring to provide material support to a foreign terrorist
organization based on translation into Arabic of materials that praise
terrorist acts, raises significant concerns about how and the extent to
which speech is criminalized. Concerns about the scope of speech-based
criminal prohibitions extend beyond the terrorism context. Other
examples include criminalizing a host of risk-creation conducts,
ostensibly to prevent future harm. These statutes range from
conspiracies and attempts to instructional speech providing information
useful for the commission of crimes. Indeed, when one reviews the
broad array of instances in which speech is now criminalized, it begins
to seem as if speech has become overcriminalized.
The overcriminalization of speech parallels a broader trend in
substantive criminal law, which has undergone an unprecedented
expansion in recent years. 9 The “overcriminalization phenomenon” as
commentators have dubbed it, is the tendency for a constantly growing
array of criminal statutes to make individuals liable for conviction and
punishment for a wider range of behaviors. 10 Scholars have identified
four principal manifestations of this phenomenon. First, federalization
of crimes, the explosive growth in the scope and size of federal criminal
offenses. 11 Second, overlapping crimes, namely, re-criminalizing conduct
that has already been proscribed by another statute. 12 Third,
endangerment offenses, where harm is merely threatened but the risk has
not yet materialized. 13 Fourth, ancillary crimes, namely, offenses that
function as surrogates for the prosecution of primary or core crimes. 14
Although the literature describing this general phenomenon is
Id. at 69.
See generally DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 3–6 (2008) (discussing the scope of the dramatic expansion in criminal laws).
10 See generally William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L.
REV. 506, 512–15 (2001) (noting the continual expansion of criminal statutes); see also Erik Luna,
The Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 712–19 (2005) (discussing the
features of the “overcriminalization phenomenon”).
11 See Sara Sun Beale, Essay, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and
Mattress Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747, 753–56 (2005) (discussing the
overfederalization of criminal law).
12 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 36–40.
13 Id. In this Article, the phrases “endangerment crimes,” “risk-creation crimes,” and “harm
prevention crimes” are used interchangeably.
14 See Norman Abrams, The New Ancillary Offenses, 1 CRIM. L.F. 1 (1989).
8
9
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extensive, any specific discussion of the overcriminalization of speech is
notably absent. This Article fills that void.
As it turns out, one particular category of criminal prohibitions on
speech—endangerment speech crimes—is the area in which the
overcriminalization of speech is most prominent and disconcerting.
Endangerment speech crimes consist of prohibitions that target
expression that ostensibly increase the likelihood of inflicting future
harm. Examples include conspiracy to commit terrorism-related crimes,
criminal bans on verbal harassment, and an array of statutes covering
disorderly conduct, including prohibitions on public drunkenness and
expression of profanities in public. 15 In recent years, federal and state
legislatures have expanded the scope of these crimes by prohibiting a
myriad of crime prevention offenses that target risk-creating speech. 16
The overcriminalization of speech is, therefore, yet another facet of the
overall overcriminalization phenomenon.
To some readers, the claim that current laws overcriminalize
speech may seem highly implausible in light of the popular belief
concerning the fundamental importance of the right to free speech in
American constitutional law. A skeptical observer might respond that
speech not only is not overcriminalized, but also is broadly protected;
some might even contend over-protected. Indeed, at first blush, the U.S.
Supreme Court has been strongly protective of speech, beginning with
the landmark Brandenburg v. Ohio decision—which significantly
limited the criminalization of advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation only to cases where the speech is “directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action” 17—and culminating in the recent decision in United States
v. Stevens, which struck down a federal statute that criminalized the
commercial creation, sale, or possession of illegal depictions of
treatment of animals, considered to be cruel. 18
However, a more nuanced examination of the relationship between
First Amendment jurisprudence and substantive criminal law reveals
that this preliminary assumption provides only a partial account of the
more complex interplay between them. In fact, these two areas of law
run along two parallel lines: Although under its free speech
jurisprudence the Court significantly contracts the government’s power
to adopt content-based restrictions on speech, at the same time,
substantive criminal law continuously expands restrictions on speech
via broadly-worded speech crimes.

15
16
17
18

See infra Part I.A–C.
See infra Part I.A–C.
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (emphases added).
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010).
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The explanation for this seemingly inconsistent treatment of these
two areas of law lies in the limited boundaries of the First
Amendment. 19 While some speech enjoys First Amendment scrutiny,
numerous statutes simply fall beyond its reach and are not measured
against its rigorous standards. 20 Existing First Amendment doctrine
treats many types of speech crimes as categorically falling beyond the
ambit of First Amendment coverage. Consequently, a wide array of
crimes—including
attempts,
conspiracies,
solicitations,
and
instructional speech—are not subject to free speech scrutiny. Instead,
they are viewed as speech acts, an integral part of an illegal course of
conduct or “speech brigaded with action” (speech acts). 21
Speech acts consist of speech that performs some functional task
other than the expressive communication of ideas. 22 These include
various forms of expressions that are so intertwined with performative
actions that they are treated similarly to conduct, rather than pure
speech. The implications of the speech act classification are far-reaching
because the First Amendment provides unique protection to speech,
subjecting regulations of speech to numerous restrictions that
regulations of conduct need not satisfy, most notably, the stringent strict
scrutiny review. 23 Importantly, speech acts are not viewed as implicating
the fundamental right to speak and, therefore, are not subject to strict
scrutiny review. 24 Instead, similar to general criminal prohibitions,
speech acts are subject to only the most lenient judicial review, namely,
rational basis scrutiny, which is notably deferential to the government. 25
The upshot is that speech acts are categorically excluded from the scope
of First Amendment coverage. 26
Commentators have long grappled with speech acts doctrines, but
have yet to provide a single comprehensive theory that explains which
speech falls within the boundaries of free speech coverage and which

19 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration
of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1767 (2004) (noting the limited boundaries of
the First Amendment).
20 Id. at 1771 (providing examples of civil and criminal restrictions on speech that fall beyond
the scope of the First Amendment).
21 See Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal Courses of
Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Unchartered Zones, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1277,
1283 n.16 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (elaborating on the explanations for the
exclusion of First Amendment coverage from many speech crimes).
22 See KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH, CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 43, 57 (1989).
23 See Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN. L. REV. 767, 776–78 (2001).
24 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1281–84 (discussing examples not subject to First
Amendment scrutiny).
25 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 624 (3d ed.
2006) (providing examples of the Court upholding legislation using rational basis review).
26 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1769 (noting that speech acts are excluded from First
Amendment coverage).
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remains beyond its scope. 27 One prominent account suggests that
certain kinds of speech, including offers, agreements, orders,
permissions, and threats constitute “situation-altering utterances,”
which are not subject to free speech scrutiny. 28 Another explanation
suggests that certain types of expressions, speech acts among them, are
categorically excluded from the ambit of the First Amendment. 29 The
latter account further contends that legal doctrines alone are unable to
explain what speech is covered by the First Amendment and that an
array of nonlegal factors—such as economic, political, and cultural
considerations—may explain the lack of free speech coverage from
various types of speech. 30
Existing doctrines, however, are fraught with difficulties, and are
unable to provide an analytical framework by which to identify the
criteria for determining which speech merits constitutional protection.
Notably, they fail to explain why various speech crimes consisting of
mere speech, unaccompanied by any action, evade free speech scrutiny,
even when the expression is prohibited because of its communicative
message.
The purpose of this Article is to develop an analytical framework
for policymakers to determine when it is appropriate to criminalize
speech. While current accounts tell only a partial story, and one that is
mostly viewed through the First Amendment lens, this Article focuses
on the implications of speech crimes from a criminal law perspective by
revisiting the justifications for these crimes. The main question that it
asks is when, and to what extent, may speech alone, unaccompanied by
further acts, constitute the actus reus of a criminal offense? In other
words, when does pure speech transform into criminal behavior? This
question has been further sharpened in recent years with the huge
explosion in cyberspace communication. Its modified version asks:
When does virtual crime, consisting merely of speech, become a crime
in the real world?
To answer this question, I develop several constitutional
constraints as well as constraints stemming from criminal law theory to
limit the ambit of speech crimes. The proposed framework suggests a
two-step analysis. It begins with the premise that the kernel of what
makes a crime one that criminalizes speech lies in the fact that its actus
reus is speech of some sort. An initial step in assessing when
criminalization is warranted would be asking whether the actus reus of
27 See John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482, 1495–97 (1975).
28 See GREENAWALT, supra note 22 (discussing “situation-altering utterances”).
29 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1771 (explaining the lack of coverage from certain speech
restrictions).
30 Id. at 1788–89 (elaborating on nonlegal factors relevant to free speech coverage).
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the crime consists of a content-based restriction on speech. If the statute
targets speech because of the harm that flows from its content, then the
criminal prohibition needs to be scrutinized under First Amendment
doctrines. The second step consists of examining familiar free speech
considerations that are typically applied when a content-based
restriction on speech is concerned, such as the value of the speech and
the type of harm it threatens. 31 Importantly, appropriate risk
management must account for the likelihood that grave harm would be
inflicted before speech is criminalized. This Article, therefore, proposes
that a probability test is incorporated into the definition of
endangerment speech crimes to ensure that speech is criminalized only
when a cost-benefit analysis demonstrates substantial likelihood of dire
harm resulting from the speech. From a criminal law perspective,
incorporating a probability requirement assures that speech is
criminalized only if the perpetrator’s dangerousness is established.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains how speech is
currently overcriminalized and elaborates on the problems that have
arisen under existing statutes. It demonstrates that as a part of the
criminal justice system’s increasing reliance on preemptive law
enforcement, legislatures adopt a myriad of endangerment speech
crimes without requiring substantial probability that the speech would
result in grave harm. This Part further frames the overcriminalization of
speech argument within the broader context of the overcriminalization
phenomenon in general and the increasing use of preventive measures
in criminal law in particular.
Part II considers existing doctrines that attempt to explain when
speech should be immune from First Amendment scrutiny. It critiques
these explanations by contending that they are unable to properly draw
the legal boundary between speech that warrants constitutional
protection and one that justifies criminal sanction. This Part concludes
that since current doctrines are unable to offer a comprehensive account
of the absence of First Amendment scrutiny from many endangerment
speech crimes, an alternative doctrinal framework should be adopted to
evaluate the constitutionality of speech crimes.
Part III offers several constraints—constitutional ones as well as
those grounded in substantive criminal law—to limit the scope of
endangerment speech crimes. It proposes that all speech crimes would
be subject to both strict scrutiny judicial review and to internal
constraints stemming from criminal law theory. It further develops a
number of guidelines that may construct such judicial review and
alleviate some of the concerns that arise from the overcriminalization of
speech.
31

See infra Part III.A.1.
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I. HOW SPEECH IS OVERCRIMINALIZED
In recent years, the paradigm model for law enforcement has
shifted from reactive enforcement to proactive prevention. 32 This was
done by significantly expanding law enforcement’s prophylactic
measures and preventive statutes. 33 The statutes include inchoateanticipatory crimes, i.e., offenses that proscribe conduct that does not
cause harm at the time it is committed, but creates a risk that increases
the likelihood that harm will ensue in the future. 34 The imposition of
criminal sanction is justified as a preventive measure, designed to
preemptively reduce the odds of future harm. 35 Examples of riskcreation crimes fall under three main categories: inchoate offenses
including conspiracies; solicitations; and attempts, endangerment or
anticipatory offenses, such as reckless endangerment, prohibitions
against driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs, and crimes of
possession, mainly possession of illicit drugs or weapons. 36
One overlooked feature of risk-creation crimes is that they often
prohibit various types of speech and expression. Speech tends to be
criminalized under the rubric of endangerment crimes as part of
legislatures’ efforts to prevent potentially dangerous future criminal
conduct. These crimes target the risks that certain speech might
persuade people to engage in unlawful activities or inform them how to
engage in such activities. While the speech is not in itself harmful when
it is expressed, communicating certain messages has the potential to
result in harmful effects. Many jurisdictions have adopted a myriad of
endangerment crimes whose actus reus consist of nothing but speech. 37
Examples range from expanding the scope of conspiracy doctrines to
cover agreements of ambiguous nature, to extending the reach of
attempt doctrines to criminalize speech that falls short of a substantial
step to commit a crime, culminating in criminalizing a host of speechbased harassment and verbal bullying.

32 See Paul H. Robinson, Commentary, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking Preventive
Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1429 (2001) (noting the recent shift in
criminal justice system towards prevention).
33 See Christopher Slobogin, A Jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 1–3
(2003) (noting that the Court has recently expanded its understanding of preventive detention).
34 See R.A. Duff, Criminalizing Endangerment, in DEFINING CRIMES: ESSAYS ON THE SPECIAL
PART OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 43, 51 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005) (elaborating on the
justifications for endangerment crimes).
35 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 161–62 (discussing the criminalization of risk-creation
behaviors).
36 Id. at 159–77 (providing examples of risk-creation offenses).
37 See infra Part I.A–C and accompanying notes.
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The overcriminalization of speech stems not only from broadly
worded speech crimes, but also from prosecutorial overreaching. 38 The
risks of abuse of prosecutorial discretion are not limited to the specific
context of endangerment speech crimes as unchecked prosecutorial
discretion is sometimes used to reach conducts that do not warrant
criminal sanction. 39 But expansive statutes criminalizing various forms
of endangerment speech further exacerbate the risks of prosecutorial
overreaching due to the vagueness, overbreadth, and targeting of
inchoate conduct that characterize these laws. 40 The continual increase
in preventive crimes in turn facilitates prosecutorial overreaching,
thereby further contributing to the overcriminalization of speech.
The overcriminalization of speech has been greatly exacerbated
over the last two decades due to the unprecedented rise in the use of the
Internet as the dominant form of communication. This change not only
has generated new technologies that effectively disseminate various
forms of speech but also has created new risks flowing from the content
of such speech. 41 The Internet provides a convenient forum for
individuals who share potentially dangerous interests, such as
pedophilia, to discuss these ideas and play out their thoughts,
sometimes converting them into action. 42 Moreover, although
cyberspace communication often includes more traditional one-on-one
interactions in which the speaker communicates directly with the target
by sending her private messages through emails or social networking
sites, the Internet’s primary impact is its ability to effectively reach an
unlimited and unidentified audience. While under First Amendment
doctrines, the paradigm “public forum” included only streets and parks,
the Internet has become the modern equivalent of the “public forum.”43
The Internet’s unique features, thus, raise novel challenges for the
criminal law, as the following sections elaborate. 44
The prime example of an endangerment speech crime is advocacy
of law violation, namely, speech that may lead listeners to commit
crimes. The constitutionality of such a statute was the issue at stake in
the landmark U.S. Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg v. Ohio. 45 In
Brandenburg, the defendant, a Ku Klux Klan leader, invited a journalist
38 See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 1715 & n.1 (2006)
(noting the relationship between broad statutes and “heavy-handed” law enforcement).
39 See Beale, supra note 11 (discussing broader aspects of prosecutorial overreaching).
40 See infra Part I.C (discussing prosecutorial overreaching in sexting prosecutions).
41 See Susan W. Brenner & Megan Rehberg, “Kiddie Crime”? The Utility of Criminal Law in
Controlling Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2009) (discussing new risks resulting
from technological advancements).
42 See infra Part I.A.2.
43 See Peter Linzer, From the Gutenberg Bible to Net Neutrality—How Technology Makes Law
and Why English Majors Need to Understand It, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 3 (2008).
44 See infra Part I.A–C.
45 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
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and a cameraman to a Klan rally, where hooded armed figures marched,
burning a cross and uttering racist epithets. 46 Brandenburg was charged
and convicted under Ohio’s Criminal Syndicalism Act prohibiting
advocacy of crime. The Court, however, struck down the statute on
overbreadth grounds, finding it to be unconstitutional because it
punished mere advocacy of unlawful actions, even in circumstances
where the speaker did not threaten or incite others to commit imminent
crimes. 47 The Court held that the prosecution failed to prove that
Brandenburg’s speech was likely to cause an imminent public
disturbance or that Brandenburg had attempted to instigate immediate
violence. 48 For the Ohio legislature, the increased risk that the speech
would result in any harm—regardless of its likelihood—was sufficient in
its mind to justify criminal prohibition. But the low likelihood that the
risk-creating speech would lead to law violation was insufficient for the
Brandenburg Court, which explicitly rejected criminalization of mere
endangerment speech.
Following Brandenburg, a state may interfere with individuals’
right to advocate unlawful action only when two requirements are met:
high likelihood of law violation and imminence of harm. While the
Brandenburg Court has left the “imminence” requirement ambiguous,
the Court’s decision in Hess v. Indiana clarified that advocacy of
violence “at some indefinite future time” is not sufficient to take speech
outside First Amendment shelter; only a “rational inference” of
“imminent disorder” will suffice. 49 In light of Hess, imminent means
nothing but immediate action, which is an almost impossible burden to
satisfy. 50
However, an entirely different picture emerges, one which is far
less speech protective, when considering a host of other speech crimes.
The Brandenburg test has been strictly limited to advocacy of crime and
has not been further extended to related types of endangerment
speech. 51 As the following sections will demonstrate, numerous criminal
statutes broadly prohibit different types of risk-creating speech, without
requiring any probability that the speech at issue would result in any
harm, let alone grave harm, as a prerequisite for criminalization. These
statutes are not only in tension with Brandenburg’s holding, but also
raise doubts concerning the justifications for criminalization because
speech is criminalized despite the lack of evidence concerning the
Id. at 445.
Id. at 447–49.
48 Id.
49 Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108–09 (1973).
50 See GREENAWALT, supra note 22, at 209 (stating that Hess’s interpretation of imminence “is
very restrictive”).
51 See Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 669
(2009) (noting Brandenburg’s limited application).
46
47
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perpetrator’s dangerousness. Prohibiting the mere potential for future
harm enables the criminalization of a multitude of risky conducts that
arguably do not warrant criminal sanctions, thus accounting for the
overcriminalization of speech.
While most legal theorists agree that various types of risk-creating
behaviors justify criminalization, there is a significant controversy
concerning the extent of criminal liability. 52 Commentators note that
endangerment crimes are too expansive in scope and need to be
redrafted, or at least subject to more intense judicial scrutiny. 53 Several
scholars have begun to consider limits on endangerment crimes. 54 The
main questions are: how early should the criminal law intervene; and
when is a given behavior sufficiently dangerous to justify preventive
criminal intervention? Many commentators agree that endangerment
crimes should be significantly limited only to offenses that create serious
risk of harm, requiring substantial probability that harm would occur. 55
A probability assessment considers the causal link between risk-creation
conduct and actual materialization of harm, supporting criminalization
only if there is conclusive empirical evidence to establish such nexus. 56
As the following sections demonstrate, many criminal statutes fall short
of satisfying this requirement. 57
The recent proliferation of endangerment speech crimes calls for
the adoption of several constraints that might limit their scope. Existing
proposals for limits on endangerment crimes in general provide the
analytical foundation for developing a theory specifically designed to
constrain the scope of speech-based endangerment statutes. This Article
will revisit these limits in Part III and provide its own proposal for how
to assess the propriety of criminalizing endangerment speech. 58
Before delving into specific examples of endangerment speech
crimes, it is worth pausing briefly to frame the overcriminalization of
speech argument within a broader context. Overcriminalization of
speech is principally one facet of a general problem concerning the
excessive use of criminal statutes, commonly referred to as
“overcriminalization.” 59 Coining this term, Sanford Kadish noted that
criminal statutes often encompass conduct that is not the target of

See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 161.
See Slobogin, supra note 33, at 62 (noting the breadth of preventive laws).
54 See, e.g., Duff, supra note 34, at 43–62 (proposing limits on the scope of endangerment
crimes).
55 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 159–77 (discussing limits to curb overcriminalization).
56 See Carissa Byrne Hessick, Disentangling Child Pornography from Child Sex Abuse, 88
WASH. U. L. REV. 853, 869–73 (2011) (discussing the absence of empirical evidence to establish
the link between risk and harm).
57 See infra Part I.A–C.
58 See infra Part III.
59 See Luna, supra note 10, at 712–17; see also HUSAK, supra note 9, at 3–5.
52
53
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legislative concern. 60 Kadish broadly defined overcriminalization as the
use of the criminal law to pursue public policy objectives for which it is
poorly suited. 61 In recent years, criminal law scholars have vehemently
criticized the continual expansion of substantive criminal law, warning
against the costs and burdens incurred by the criminal justice system, as
well as against the dangers this expansion poses to individual
defendants. 62 They argue that there are too many broadly worded
criminal statutes, covering a wide range of behaviors that do not justify
the use of the resources of criminal enforcement. 63 Erik Luna, for
example, summarizes “the overcriminalization phenomenon,” which
consists of untenable offenses, superfluous statutes, doctrines that
overextend culpability crimes without jurisdictional authority, grossly
disproportionate punishments, and excessive or pretextual enforcement
of petty violations. 64
With this background in mind, this Article turns to its main
contribution concerning the specific problem of the overcriminalization
of speech. The subparts below identify concrete manifestations of this
phenomenon by considering prominent examples of endangerment
speech crimes. These statutes fall under three categories, tracking the
classification of general endangerment (nonspeech) crimes, and include
inchoate crimes, independent endangerment crimes, and possession
crimes.
Inchoate Crimes

A.

Inchoate offenses, such as conspiracies and attempts, provide a
prime example of how much speech is currently overcriminalized.
1.

Conspiracy

a. Terrorism
Recent years have seen a significant increase in preventive criminal
statutes prohibiting speech associated with terrorism. Criminalization of
terrorism-related behaviors is facilitated through two factors: first, the
expansion of the scope of traditional conspiracy doctrines and second,

60 See Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and Sentencing Processes, 75
HARV. L. REV. 904, 909 (1962).
61 See Sanford H. Kadish, The Crisis of Overcriminalization, 374 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 157 (1967).
62 See Luna, supra note 10, at 703–04, 725–29 (describing overcriminalization and its costs).
63 See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 507 (noting the broad range of crimes, including trivial ones).
64 See Luna, supra note 10, at 717 (summarizing the main features of overcriminalization).
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the broad coverage of the prohibition against providing material
support to foreign terrorist organizations (FTO).
The continual threats of terrorism have led the federal government
and the states to create numerous endangerment crimes targeted
towards reducing the risks that may emanate from behaviors believed to
be related to the activities of terrorist organizations. 65 Following 9/11,
the government placed a premium on early detection and prevention by
vigorously prosecuting suspects whose conduct was perceived as posing
threats to national security. 66 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B make it a crime to
knowingly provide material support to any designated FTO, with the
phrase “material support” broadly defined to include “training,” “expert
advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel.”67 Bringing criminal
charges under this statute has become the main tool used by the
government in exercising preemptive measures against those suspected
of connections to terrorism. 68
Various types of provision of services and expert advice or
assistance are often grounded in speech and expression, thus arguably
meeting the “support” requirement enumerated in § 2339B. For
instance, a publication that praises terrorism would be perceived as one
form of support for a terrorist organization. As the discussion below
illustrates, the broadly worded statute provides the government with
expansive powers to prosecute individuals for expressing a host of
political viewpoints, when it suspects that the expressive messages
conveyed by the speech increase the chances that these messages would
persuade others to engage in terrorism.
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (HLP), the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the criminal prohibition on advocacy performed in
coordination with, or at the direction of, a foreign terrorist organization
was not unconstitutional as applied to the particular activities stated by
the plaintiffs. 69 More specifically, the Court held that the plaintiffs were
prohibited from providing legal support to PKK (a designated FTO on
how to follow and implement humanitarian and international law),
even when that support consisted of peaceful resolutions of disputes and
the petitioning of various international bodies. 70 The Court rejected the
plaintiffs’ vagueness claim, finding that the plaintiffs’ specific conduct
squarely fell within the scope of the terms “training” and “expert advice
65 See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 456–58 (2007) (discussing the scope of liability for
terrorism conspiracies).
66 Id. at 429–32 (describing the government’s policy concerning early prevention).
67 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B (2012).
68 See Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of
Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 26–30 (2005).
69 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 22–24 (2010).
70 Id. at 29–31, 35–39.
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or assistances” required by the statute. As for the claim that the statute
violates the First Amendment, the Court acknowledged that the statute
limits the scope of free speech, but nonetheless held that it was a
permissible preventive measure that criminalizes aid that makes
terrorist attacks more likely to occur. 71
Cognizant of the fact that the above statute adopts a content-based
prohibition on speech, the HLP decision purports to draw on two
important distinctions demarcating the legal boundary between
protected and prohibited speech. The first distinguishes between mere
membership and actual support of the organization by implying that
joining a terrorist organization is a constitutionally protected activity,
while engaging in speech that aids that organization may be
criminalized. 72 The second distinction rests on the purported difference
between independent advocacy of terrorism, which is constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment, and concerted activity
amounting to provision of service to the FTO, in coordination with or
at the direction of this organization, which is criminalized. 73 Prohibiting
the latter is justified, reasoned the Court, because the probability of a
terrorist attack increases due to receiving support. 74 It is crucial to note,
however, that the HLP holding does not require a substantial probability
that the speech would result in tangible harm. Any slight increase in the
probability of harm, regardless of its actual likelihood, suffices to uphold
criminalization.
The prohibition against providing material support criminalizes
not only the provision of support to FTOs but also conspiring to do so. 75
A significant component in the government’s use of preventive statutes
includes bringing criminal charges for conspiring to provide material
support to FTOs. 76 The above statutory language provides an important
measure for the government to broaden the scope of conspiracy law in
order to curb what it perceives as potential risks of future terrorism.
Notably, these conspiracy charges are based solely on the defendants’
engagement in various forms of speech.
Examples of the government’s use of conspiracy doctrine to
criminalize different types of endangerment speech fall under two
categories, the first involving prosecutions against Muslim religious
leaders whose teachings are perceived as advocating terrorism, and the
second involving prosecutions of individuals who operate, post

71
72
73
74
75
76

Id. at 35–36.
Id. at 39–40.
Id. at 23–24.
Id. at 4–5.
18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2012).
See Chesney, supra note 65, at 456 (discussing liability for terrorism conspiracies).
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messages, or otherwise contribute to various Islamic websites suspected
of connections with terrorist organizations. 77
The prosecution of Omar Abdel Rahman provides a salient
example of the first category of cases. 78 Rahman, a Muslim religious
figure (Sheik), was charged with seditious conspiracy and solicitation
based on the government’s theory that he was the leader of the terrorist
network that plotted to bomb the World Trade Center in 1993. 79 The
government presented evidence that Rahman dispensed religious
opinions (fatwas) on the holiness of terrorist acts, instructing his
supporters to “do jihad with the sword, with the cannon, with the
grenades, with the missile . . . against God’s enemies.” 80 This speech,
argued the government, amounted to conspiracy to commit crimes of
terrorism. A jury convicted him on all counts, and he was sentenced to
life in prison. 81 On appeal, the Second Circuit rejected Rahman’s
argument that his conviction violated the First Amendment. 82 The court
held that criminal conspiracies were not protected simply because they
were formed through words. 83 While the Second Circuit treated the case
as one involving conspiracy, much of the evidence it relied upon to
prove this conspiracy consisted of the defendant’s advocacy of
terrorism. 84 The Rahman case thus illustrates the blurred line between
advocacy of crime—which is generally protected under the Brandenburg
test—in the absence of high likelihood and imminence of harm, and
conspiracy to commit terrorist acts, which is criminalized.
The case mentioned in the Introduction, United States v. Mehanna,
is illustrative of the second category of cases concerning criminal
charges against individuals who advocate terrorism on Islamic
websites. 85 Mehanna’s conviction of conspiring to provide material
support to al-Qaeda rested on two separate clusters of activities: one
related to a trip he made to Yemen, allegedly to join an al-Qaeda
training camp, which he failed to find; the other was speech-based,
namely, his translation of al-Qaeda’s propaganda materials from Arabic
into English, which he posted on a jihadist website. 86 Since this Article’s
main thesis concerns the overcriminalization of speech, the analysis
below focuses solely on the latter grounds for conviction.

77 United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013); United States v. Al-Hussayen,
No. CR03-048-C-EJL, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29793 (D. Idaho Apr. 6, 2004).
78 United States v. Rahman, 189 F.3d 88, 104 (2d Cir. 1999).
79 18 U.S.C. § 2384 (2012); see also Rahman, 189 F.3d 88.
80 Rahman, 189 F.3d at 104 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
81 Id. at 111.
82 Id. at 114–18.
83 Id. at 115.
84 See Healy, supra note 51, at 670–71.
85 See United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013).
86 Id.
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The government alleged that Mehanna’s translations constituted
“material support” in the form of a “service” to a terrorist organization
because they aided al-Qaeda by spreading its messages and by
facilitating recruitment of followers who would pursue terrorist
endeavors. 87 The government further alleged that Mehanna agreed with
others to provide material support to al-Qaeda and that he committed
several overt acts in furtherance of this conspiracy, including watching
jihadi videos, discussing efforts to create like-minded youth in the
Boston area, and discussing attending a terrorist camp. 88 Mehanna
denied having any direct connection with al-Qaeda, insisting that the
government was required to establish such connection. 89 The jury
accepted the government’s theory and convicted Mehanna, among
others, based on the translated materials. 90 Mehanna appealed his
conviction, arguing, in part, that the district court committed legal
errors in charging the jury with respect to the translations. 91
Writing for the court, Judge Selya rejected Mehanna’s argument
that the translations merely amounted to independent advocacy, which
the HLP Court held was constitutionally protected speech. 92 The court
reiterated HLP’s holding that advocacy performed in coordination with
or at the direction of an FTO is not shielded by the First Amendment. 93
Dismissing Mehanna’s claim that the jury instructions failed to define
the term “coordination,” the court held that the district court defined
the term functionally by explaining to the jury that independent
advocacy for either an FTO or an FTO’s goals does not amount to
coordination. The court further stressed that the government’s theory
rested on the premise that the translations are one type of “service” and
thus amount to provision of material support, which the statute
prohibits. 94 Therefore, the court held that the jury instructions
embraced the legal construct adopted by the court’s holding in HLP that
“service,” as material support, “refers to concerted activity, not
independent advocacy,” and thus is not “shielded by the First
Amendment.” 95 The court further clarified that neither the statute itself
nor the Court’s decision in HLP require that the person providing the

Id. at 49 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 44–46.
89 Id. at 46, 50.
90 Id. at 42.
91 Id. at 48 (noting that the defendant argued that the jury’s instructions were erroneous in
three respects: they “(i) fail[ed] to define the term ‘coordination’; (ii) [they] incorrectly direct[ed]
the jury not to consider the First Amendment; and (iii) [they] should have been replaced by a set
of instructions that [the defendant] unsuccessfully proffered to the district court”).
92 Id. at 49.
93 Id. (citing Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 24 (2010)).
94 Id. at 49.
95 Id. (citing Holder, 561 U.S. at 23–24).
87
88
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alleged support to an FTO have a direct connection to the FTO. 96
Addressing Mehanna’s claim that the jury’s finding of “coordination”
with an FTO lacked sufficient supporting evidence, the court further
held that even if that proof was factually insufficient, the conviction was
independently supported based on the government’s Yemen trip theory,
for which the government presented mass evidence. 97
Cognizant of the difficulties that the government’s “translation as
service” theory posed for First Amendment jurisprudence, the court
attempted to play down the significance of the translation-centric
charge by characterizing it only as an “alternative basis” for
conviction. 98 But while Mehanna’s trip to Yemen figured more
prominently in the decision, nowhere did the court reject the
government’s unprecedented theory that mere translation of materials
already publicly available on the Internet amounts to provision of
service to al-Qaeda. The court accepted the government’s expansive
position, even though it neither provided evidence that Mehanna ever
met or communicated with anyone from al-Qaeda, nor demonstrated
that the translation was sent to this organization. 99
The Mehanna decision is deeply troubling for several reasons.
First, it demonstrates how the prohibition against providing material
support to FTOs criminalizes a lot of speech, despite the arguably weak
causal link between the speech in question and the risk of future harm.
As the Court has long noted, the Constitution is not a suicide pact, and
defendants’ right to free speech should be outweighed by clear risks
emanating from dangerous speech, provided that such risks are indeed
established. 100 However, the evidence in the Mehanna case fell short of
demonstrating high likelihood of substantial harm to national security.
Instead, criminalization of speech was upheld there based on mere risk
that the translations would support al-Qaeda by inciting others to
commit terrorist acts. Furthermore, existing literature offers little
evidence of a correlation between religiously based speech or particular
religious ideologies and terrorism. 101 Convicting individuals for
disseminating speech that merely praises an ideology, including a
violent and repugnant one, rather than explicitly calling for commission
of terrorist acts, is especially disconcerting because such speech reflects
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51.
98 Id. at 50.
99 See David Cole, 39 Ways to Limit Free Speech, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Apr. 19, 2012, 3:15 PM),
http://www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2012/apr/19/39-ways-limit-free-speech.
100 Cf. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 36–37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that individual constitutional rights may be encroached when significant risks are
identified).
101 See Aziz Z. Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism,
89 TEX. L. REV. 833, 876–80, 900 (2011).
96
97
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mere aspirations rather than concrete operational plans. The assumed
dangers stemming from glorifying terrorist acts have yet to be verified
empirically.
Second, the decision undermines existing First Amendment
jurisprudence by expanding government’s authority to suppress
political expression and association in the name of perceived threats to
national security, creating a “chilling” effect on political dissent. 102
Mehanna’s ideological support for al-Qaeda undoubtedly expresses
extremist viewpoints that are rightly perceived by the vast majority of
Americans as abhorrent. Judge Richard Posner, for example, contends
that speech that supports terrorism does not warrant constitutional
protection because such messages do not comport with Western
democratic values. 103 In contrast, this Article argues that it is precisely
that type of abominable messages that are the paradigm example of
political speech warranting constitutional protection as long as they fall
short of establishing high likelihood of harm. The strength of the First
Amendment and a democratic regime’s tolerance towards dissenting
opinions are best measured when considering these appalling cases.
Third, and most importantly, a fundamental concern raised by the
Mehanna decision is the surprising interplay between general criminal
law and First Amendment law. As noted earlier, speech that incites
others to violence is generally protected under Brandenburg’s stringent
test. Prior to 9/11, Mehanna could not have been convicted for advocacy
of terrorism even if he had written the inciting materials himself, unless
the government could demonstrate the high likelihood and immanency
requirements, a standard virtually impossible to meet for written
texts. 104 Arguably, prosecutions of individuals based on their advocacy
of terrorism directly clashes with Brandenburg. 105 Under Brandenburg,
the First Amendment should have protected Mehanna’s expression of
abstract views supporting violence by someone acting independently of
an FTO, even when those views coincide with those of the terrorist
organization.
Nevertheless, by taking the indirect path of criminalizing
conspiracy to provide material support to an FTO, the criminal law
enables the government to accomplish precisely the same result that the
First Amendment squarely prohibits. 106 Although under federal law
102 Cf. David Cole, Essay, The First Amendment’s Borders: The Place of Holder v.
Humanitarian Law Project in First Amendment Doctrine, 6 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 147, 147–50
(2012) (noting that the HLP decision creates a chilling effect on legitimate political speech).
103 See RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF
NATIONAL EMERGENCY 120–25 (2006).
104 See Cole, supra note 99.
105 See Healy, supra note 51, at 680.
106 See Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of Speech, Support for Terrorism, and the
Challenge of Global Constitutional Law, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1, 28 (2011).
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there is no statute directly criminalizing incitement to terrorism,
substantive criminal law—via its generous conspiracy doctrines—
provides the government with ample measures to limit the spread of
allegedly terrorist messages. Importantly, unlike First Amendment
jurisprudence, requiring high likelihood of harm, conspiracy law
criminalizes speech without requiring any nexus between the expressive
messages and actual harm. Conspiracy law, thus, functions as an
effective means for the government to bypass First Amendment
jurisprudence’s strict requirements for prohibiting advocacy of violence,
resulting in a direct collision between these two areas of law. 107
Advocacy of crime (ostensibly including terrorism), which is
constitutionally protected under free speech doctrines, becomes
prohibited under conspiracy doctrine, with no constitutional
constraints to limit criminalization. In practice, the upshot is that
advocacy of crime is protected only as long as the crime at issue is not
terrorism-related.
The government’s use of the conspiracy to provide material
support statute raises not only First Amendment concerns but also a
host of other concerns from the perspective of substantive criminal
law. 108 First, these prosecutions expand criminal liability above and
beyond traditional conspiracy doctrines to cover conduct of highly
ambiguous nature. 109 Commentators have long criticized conspiracy law
in general as an unjustified expansion of criminal liability. 110 Conspiracy
liability in the terrorism context demonstrates even further enlargement
of criminal liability because these prosecutions often do not square with
conspiracy law’s main tenets: agreement, overt act, and intent.
The agreement requirement, which is the actus reus of the terrorist
conspiracy and the cornerstone of conspiracy liability is significantly
eroded if the government is not required to establish any evidence that
the defendants actually communicated with a terrorist organization.111
In a typical conspiracy prosecution, the agreement may be proven
circumstantially through concerted action toward a common
purpose. 112 But even this minimal requirement becomes diffused in
terrorism-related prosecutions, resulting in banning behaviors falling
short of concrete agreements to cooperate with others in the
commission of crimes. 113 The nature of the agreement between the
Id. at 29–30.
See Chesney, supra note 65, at 479–81, 492–93; see also NORMAN ABRAMS, ANTITERRORISM AND CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT 57–62 (4th ed. 2011).
109 See Chesney, supra note 65, at 474.
110 See Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspiracy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 413–
14 (1959).
111 See Cole, supra note 99.
112 See Chesney, supra note 65, at 448–56 (discussing the elements of conspiracy).
113 Id. at 473–74 (discussing the risks of expanding conspiracy liability).
107
108
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alleged co-conspirators is often highly equivocal given that individuals
are charged based on their ambiguous connections with unidentified
groups without clear proof of the type of relationship between the coconspirators and the FTO. 114
The overt act requirement is also diluted as the prohibition against
providing material support enables prosecution based merely on speech
that is perceived as supporting terrorism, but falls short of overt acts in
the commission of specified crimes. Conspiracy law’s mens rea of intent
is similarly eroded when individuals are prosecuted for running Islamic
websites and for dispensing religious opinions where the only proof of
criminal intent is the content of their speech. 115 No separate evidence is
required to prove the defendants’ intent to agree with the terrorist
organization to commit any crimes. Prosecution of terrorism-related
conspiracies, thus, poses particular threats in casting too broad a net,
creating a significant risk that protected speech will be used to prove
nonexistent conspiracies. 116 The upshot of expanding conspiracy
liability is that criminalization is grounded on pre-inchoate liability,
prohibiting the mere preparatory stages before liability under traditional
conspiracy doctrines could have been attached. 117
Second, an additional concern stemming from criminal law theory
rests with grounding criminal liability on associational conduct. Prior to
the Court’s decision in HLP, associational conduct could be punished
only when there was evidence that a defendant had specific intent
regarding an organization’s specific criminal ends. 118 Traditional
complicity doctrines criminalize aiding and abetting acts that are
directly linked to commission of specific crimes only. 119 The Court’s
decision in HLP significantly reduced constitutional protection against
guilt by association by relying on a dubious distinction between mere
membership in an organization and actual provision of support to the
organization. 120 This distinction, however, is notably weak, allowing the
government to circumvent the prohibition against guilt by
association. 121 Under the material support statute criminal liability is
grounded merely on an organization’s status as a terrorist group.
Following HLP, any type of relationship between an individual and the
Id. at 492–93 (noting the risks of expanding conspiracy liability).
See United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 41 (1st Cir. 2013).
116 See Steven R. Morrison, Conspiracy Law’s Threat to Free Speech, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 865,
886–87 (2013) (“[E]arlier law enforcement intervention also increases the risk that protected
speech will be used to prove nonexistent conspiracies.”); id. at 917–19.
117 See Andrew Ashworth & Lucia Zedner, Prevention and Criminalization: Justifications and
Limits, 15 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 542, 545 (2012).
118 See Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 19 (1966).
119 See Norman Abrams, The Material Support Terrorism Offenses: Perspectives Derived from
the (Early) Model Penal Code, 1 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 5, 10–11 (2005).
120 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 29–33 (2010).
121 See Huq, supra note 101, at 891–93.
114
115
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FTO would amount to provision of material support, without requiring
the government to prove the perpetrator’s particular contribution to the
FTO’s specified crimes.
An initial intuition many readers may share is that speech is
overcriminalized only in the limited context of national security, where
terrorism’s grave threats should trump individuals’ speech rights while
outside this specific area speech is broadly protected. This assumption,
however, is false. The scholarly focus on the criminalization of
terrorism-related speech overlooks the broader ramifications of
overcriminalizing speech above and beyond the terrorism context.
Legislatures’ general trend towards preventive law enforcement has also
resulted in an increase in endangerment speech offenses in additional
areas as the following subsections demonstrate.
b. Other Conspiracies Beyond Terrorism
While the terrorism context presents its unique challenges, the
government also uses broad conspiracy theories in situations that go
above and beyond this distinct realm. Conspiracy charges brought in
the case of United States v. Valle provide a prominent example in which
conspiracy doctrine has been unjustifiably expanded based on
speculative assessments of the defendant’s dangerousness. 122 Defendant
Gilberto Valle, a former New York Police Department police officer,
was charged under federal law 123 with conspiring with three other
individuals to kidnap, rape, torture, kill, cook, and eat body parts of
several identified women. 124 The prosecution had argued that Valle had
entered into an agreement with three alleged co-conspirators to commit
the above crimes and that he had formed the specific intent to carry out
the plan. 125 To prove these allegations, the prosecution largely relied on
emails and instant message “chats” that were found on his home
computer. 126 In these electronic communications, Valle discussed with
his alleged co-conspirators the gruesome details of his plan. 127 In
addition, a search of Valle’s computer revealed that he created eightynine computer folders containing the names and pictures of numerous
women. 128 Valle also accessed, without legal authorization, law
United States v. Valle, (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (overturning the jury’s conviction of the defendant).
18 U.S.C. § 1201(c) (2012) (prohibiting conspiracy to commit kidnapping). In addition,
Valle was also charged in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2) (2012), for accessing without
authorization law enforcement databases in order to obtain information about potential victims.
Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 59.
124 Valle, 301 F.R.D. at 60.
125 Id. at 59.
126 Id. at 65–77 (detailing the content of the cyberspace communication between Valle and
others).
127 Id. at 60.
128 Id. at 77.
122
123
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enforcement databases in order to obtain the home addresses and places
of business of these women. 129 The evidence also showed that Valle had
conducted Google searches for phrases like “how to abduct a girl” and
“how to chloroform a girl.” 130 While the government conceded at trial
that the Internet communications between Valle and twenty-one other
individuals were mere fantasy role play, it had argued that Valle’s
communications with three alleged co-conspirators amounted to
genuine conspiracy to actually kidnap women. 131
In response to the prosecution’s conspiracy theory, the defense
stressed that Valle merely played out a fantasy of role playing on a fetish
website, and that going through the motions of planning the alleged
kidnapping was part of that fantasy. 132 Valle communicated with his coconspirators, the argument continued, about a plan that he never meant
to carry out in the real world. 133 The defense emphasized that Valle
neither followed through on any of the acts he was accused of discussing
nor planned to do so and that the prosecution failed to establish that
Valle had taken any overt acts to turn those fantasies into violent
actions. 134
The main issue in this case was whether the evidence against Valle
was sufficient so that a rational jury could have found that Valle and his
alleged co-conspirators had entered into a genuine agreement to kidnap
several identified women and had formed the specific intent to actually
kidnap these women. 135 The government had argued that it had proved
beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the alleged conspiracy—
namely, an actual agreement between Valle and his alleged coconspirators and the overt acts in which he engaged to further this
alleged agreement and bring it to fruition by laying out the groundwork
for kidnapping, torturing, and killing the women he had singled out. 136
The defense argued that the government failed to meet that burden and
that neither an agreement nor specific intent was formed. 137 A New
York jury agreed with the government’s theory, convicting Valle on all
charges on March 12, 2013. 138
Valle appealed his conviction and on June 30, 2014, District Court
Judge Paul G. Gardephe overturned his conviction on the kidnapping
Id. at 62–63.
Id. at 76 (internal quotation marks omitted).
131 Id. at 60. The three alleged co-conspirators were Michael Van Hise, a New Jersey resident;
Aly Khan, an Indian or Pakistani resident; and Christopher Collins, a British resident known to
Valle as “Moody Blues.” Id. at 59.
132 Id. at 59–60.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 59.
135 Id.
136 Id. at 59–60, 62–63.
137 Id. at 83.
138 Id.
129
130
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conspiracy charge. 139 With respect to establishing the element of
agreement between the alleged co-conspirators to carry out their
criminal plan, the court found that the government failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Valle had indeed entered into a genuine
agreement to kidnap women. 140 The court held that “the evidentiary
record is such that it is more likely than not the case that all of Valle’s
Internet communications about kidnapping are fantasy role-play.” 141
The court observed that “[o]nce the lies and the fantastical elements are
stripped away, what is left are deeply disturbing misogynistic chats and
emails written by an individual obsessed with imagining women he
knows suffering horrific sex-related pain, terror, and degradation.”142
The court concluded that “[d]espite the highly disturbing nature of
Valle’s deviant and depraved sexual interests, his chats and emails about
these interests are not sufficient—standing alone—to make out the
elements of conspiracy to commit kidnapping.”143
With respect to proving the specific intent element, the court
further held that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Valle had formed the requisite specific criminal intent to
commit the kidnapping. 144 The court pointed at ample facts that were
indicative of Valle’s lack of intent, supporting the conclusion that Valle
and his alleged co-conspirators understood that no actual kidnapping
was going to take place; these included the following facts: Valle and his
alleged co-conspirators had never undertaken any steps in the real
world to carry out their cyberspace plan and had never kidnapped
anyone neither on one of the set dates nor on a different date, the dates
that were set to purportedly commit the crimes were repeatedly ignored
without any explanation, the information regarding the victims that
Valle provided his alleged co-conspirators with was false, and the
communication with the alleged co-conspirators was substantially
indistinguishable from the numerous chats that the government
conceded were mere fantasy role play. 145
The Valle case best captures the legal difficulties in distinguishing
between electronic communications in the “virtual world” and actual
acts in the “real world.” The main point of contention in this case was
whether there was an actual crossing of the line from fantasy to reality,
from mere thoughts, speech, and cyberspace role playing to real-life

139 Id. at 62 (holding, however, that Valle’s conviction for exceeding “his authorized access to a
federal database” shall be affirmed).
140 Id. at 61–62.
141 Id. at 104.
142 Id. at 61.
143 Id. at 61–62.
144 Id.
145 Id. at 60–61.
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violent crimes. 146 The jury accepted the prosecution’s theory that Valle
had indeed crossed that line between engaging in mere speech in the
realm of cyberspace and taking concrete steps in practice to materialize
his sexual fantasies into horrific violent crimes. 147 In finding Valle
guilty, the jury was unable to overcome prejudices and biases that stem
from the inflammatory nature of the evidence, which consisted of
extremely graphic depictions of sexual violence. Convicting Valle,
therefore, raised the danger that guilt determination was largely based
on the jury’s disgust and revulsion concerning Valle’s unusual sexual
fantasies. 148 The court, however, rejected such an expansive reading of
the conspiracy statute, stressing that the alleged conspiracy exclusively
took place in cyberspace, in a context in which even the government
conceded that Valle had engaged in countless similar fantasy role plays
with other individuals. 149 Given the evidence, the prosecution failed to
prove that Valle’s cyberspace speech had transformed into a criminal
agreement, accompanied by a specific intent, to commit kidnapping and
murder of women. 150 The decision further demonstrates the difficulties
in drawing the boundary between speech that merely raises a
generalized and unquantifiable risk of potential future harm on one
hand and dangerous behavior leading to actual harm on the other. The
decision also demonstrates the risks of convicting defendants based not
on the evidence itself but rather on emotions such as deep fear, as well
as on the “ick factor.”
Moreover, implied in Valle’s acquittal are also free speech
arguments establishing the defense’s theory that the case merely
involved sexual fantasies and role play rather than actual criminal
actions. 151 In essence, the defense’s primary contention was that the
government could not punish the defendant for engaging in “ugly
thoughts,” which are a form of protected speech under the First
Amendment. 152 The decision to prosecute Valle was, therefore,
problematic not only from the substantive criminal law’s perspective
but also from a free speech perspective. Had the court accepted the
prosecution’s unprecedented expansion of conspiracy doctrine, the
decision would have facilitated a flood of conspiracy charges based on

Id. at 61.
Id. at 59, 61.
148 Id. at 103–10 (addressing the steps taken by the court to avoid the risk that the jury would
be prejudiced against the defendant).
149 Id. at 61.
150 Id. at 102.
151 See Benjamin Weiser, ‘Ugly Thoughts’ Defense Fails; Officer Guilty in Cannibal Plot, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2013, at A1 (noting that the defense described the charges against Valle as a
“‘thought prosecution’”).
152 Id. (providing the statement of Valle’s attorney that the conviction cannot stand, because it
is based on prosecuting Valle’s ugly thoughts).
146
147
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speech from cyberspace communication that falls short of either
genuine agreements to commit a crime or specific intent to do so.
2.

Attempt

Another facet of the overcriminalization of speech problem
concerns the expansion of traditional attempt doctrines. Attempt
doctrine embodies an important constraint under which the
prosecution is required to establish that the defendant engaged in
conduct constituting a substantial step toward the commission of the
crime. 153 Some criminal statutes, however, adopt a sweeping position,
obscuring the crucial boundary between mere preparatory acts, which
are not the proper subject of criminal liability, and attempts, which
mark the point where criminal liability attaches. 154 Under these statutes,
criminal sanctions may be imposed at a much earlier stage to cover the
pre-inchoate offense stage. This often results in criminalizing an actus
reus that consists merely of ambiguous and equivocal speech,
unaccompanied by any acts that establish the defendant’s
dangerousness, as the following statute demonstrates.
Sexual predators who lure minors into engaging in sexual acts have
become a growing concern for the criminal justice system in light of the
proliferation of cyberspace communication. Responding to these
concerns, federal law adopted a criminal provision aimed at the early
targeting of sexual predators by thwarting the threat that the
communication between perpetrator and minor would materialize into
sexual abuse of the minor. 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) prohibits the following:
Whoever, using the mail or any facility or means of interstate or
foreign commerce . . . knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or
coerces any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to
engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person
can be charged with a criminal offense, or attempts to do so, shall be
fined . . . and imprisoned not less than 10 years or for life. 155

The justification for law enforcement’s preemptive intervention to
prevent sexual abuse of vulnerable minors is uncontested, as these
heinous crimes warrant the most severe criminal punishment. The
controversial issue, however, is how early in the course of
communication between perpetrator and minor the law may intervene
and what evidence suffices to demonstrate that the perpetrator has
153 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (Official Draft 1962) (defining attempt to require “a
substantial step”).
154 See Ashworth & Zedner, supra note 117 (noting the expansion of liability to the preinchoate stage).
155 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b).
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taken a substantial step towards commission of a sex crime. 156 The
circuit split concerning the proper scope of the above statute sharpens
these questions, as the cases below demonstrate.
In United States v. Rothenberg, the defendant was convicted of one
count of attempting to induce or entice a minor to engage in illicit sex,
and one count of possession of sexually explicit visual material
involving minors. 157 The first count was based on the defendant
advising an adult male how to engage in sexual acts with his elevenyear-old daughter. 158 The basis for the second count came from the
results of a warranted search of the defendant’s residence in connection
with the first count, as the defendant’s seized computer revealed
numerous sexually explicit images of minors. 159 The Eleventh Circuit
upheld the conviction, rejecting the defendant’s theory that “mere
talk . . . unaccompanied by some other form of overt conduct cannot
constitute a substantial step necessary [for] an attempt to commit an
offense . . . .” 160 The court further held that the statute does not require
proof of direct communication with a minor, and that dealing with an
adult intermediary for the purpose of attempting to entice a minor into
having sex with the defendant or some third party is sufficient to satisfy
the elements of the statute. 161
The Rothenberg court’s holding is troubling in several respects.
First, it significantly expands existing attempt doctrines. The court
adopts the government’s broad reading of the statute, upholding the
criminalization of a sexually solicitous communication, without
accompanying action. 162 Moreover, the statute’s overbroad wording
captures all types of sexual communication concerning minors, even
when minors themselves are not a part of the communication, which
takes place between consenting adults. 163 Under this approach, sexual
communication about a minor in itself constitutes a substantial step
toward commission of the target offense. 164
Furthermore, the court holds that mere sexual speech—without
evidence demonstrating either the likelihood of harm to a minor or the
156 United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2008) (noting that prosecution
requires an unmistakable proposal to engage in sex with a minor and that mere “explicit sex talk”
is insufficient).
157 United States v. Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 623 (11th Cir. 2010).
158 Id. at 624.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 626.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 627.
163 Id. at 626 (“[T]o prove an attempted exploitation offense under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b), the
Government does not have to prove the existence or identity of a specific minor victim; a
fictitious minor will suffice so long as the defendant understood and believed that a minor was
involved.”).
164 Id. at 627.
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perpetrator’s dangerousness—amounts to a substantial step towards
committing the target offense. 165 In holding so, the court virtually
obliterates attempt doctrine’s substantial step requirement, which is
designed to ensure that a defendant had crossed the boundary between
harmless speech and dangerous action. Instead, criminal liability is
expanded here to include the preparatory stages that an offender
engages in before taking any substantial step. The upshot is that an actor
who has not yet committed himself to having sex with a minor would be
criminally liable based merely on sexually based speech.
Second, one of the unintended consequences of an expansive
reading of the statute at issue concerns criminalizing improper thoughts
rather than dangerous acts. Imposing criminal liability based solely on
verbal discussion of abstract ideas obfuscates the core distinction
between actions and thoughts that is one of the fundamental tenets of
the criminal law. 166 Playing out sexual fantasies over the Internet does
not rise to the level of taking a substantial step toward having sex with a
minor. Moreover, grounding criminal liability based on some
unquantifiable risk that the speech may lead to sexual abuse is an
unjustified expansion of the criminal law. Criminalizing risk-creation
behavior is warranted only when there is substantial probability that the
sexual speech would lead to dangerous action.
In contrast with the Eleventh Circuit’s approach, the Seventh
Circuit rejects a governmental attempt to interpret the statute at issue
expansively, refusing to impose criminal sanction on speech falling
short of dangerous conduct. In United States v. Gladish, a thirty-fiveyear-old man was caught in a sting operation in which a government
agent impersonated a fourteen-year-old girl in an Internet chat room.167
Gladish visited the chat room, attempting to solicit “Abagail” to have
sex with him. 168 In a typical prosecution based on such an operation, the
defendant, after obtaining consent, goes to meet his party and is
arrested upon his arrival. 169 However, Gladish was arrested before
making any concrete travel plans. 170
Reversing Gladish’s conviction, Judge Posner used harsh words to
express his dissatisfaction with the government’s decision to prosecute
the case. 171 Posner rejected the prosecution’s theory that Gladish’s
Id.
See Douglas Husak, Rethinking the Act Requirement, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2437, 2443–44
(2007) (discussing the act requirement’s role in criminal law).
167 United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (7th Cir. 2008).
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id. (“[‘Abagail’] agreed to have sex with the defendant and in a subsequent chat he
discussed the possibility of traveling to meet her in a couple of weeks, but no arrangements were
made. He was then arrested.”).
171 Id. at 650–51.
165
166
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behavior satisfied the elements of the offense of attempting to entice a
minor, noting that the charges were based only on Gladish’s cyberspace
communication with “Abagail,” without any indication of his intention
to meet or have sex with her. 172 Posner noted that Gladish might have
believed he was playing out a fantasy, which is common in Internet
relationships. 173 Posner further stressed that “[t]reating speech (even
obscene speech) as the ‘substantial step’ would abolish any requirement
of a substantial step.” 174 Instead, added Posner, the defendant must take
some specific actions beyond speech, such as agreeing on a time and
place for the meeting, making a hotel reservation, or buying a bus or
train ticket, none of which were taken by Gladish. 175 Posner noted that
the defendant’s dangerousness is the main purpose behind punishing
attempts, and that the substantial step requirement demonstrates it,
marking the perpetrator as genuinely dangerous, “a doer and not just
one of the ‘hollow men’ of T.S. Eliot’s poem, incapacitated from
action . . . .” 176
The above circuit split stems from a doctrinal disagreement about
the nature of the complete crime of enticing a minor to engage in illicit
sex. Judge Posner’s reading implies that in order for the enticement
offense to be complete, the government must prove that the defendant
actually had sex with the minor. 177 In contrast, Judge Hodge’s reading in
Rothenberg implies that the actus reus of the complete offense consists
merely of the successful verbal persuasion of a minor, which is in itself
an inchoate speech-based crime. Under the latter position, the victim’s
state of mind—assent—constitutes the complete enticement, rather than
the sex act itself, therefore, enabling the government to prosecute
attempts at an earlier point in time, based on speech alone. The U.S.
Supreme Court has not yet resolved the circuit split concerning the
scope of the above statute.
B.

Anticipatory/Independent Endangerment Crimes

Risk-creation speech crimes consist not only of inchoate crimes
but also of independent endangerment offenses that separately
criminalize as a complete crime the creation of a risk of future injury.
Criminal responsibility under the endangerment rationale holds that
one is responsible for endangering another if one’s conduct creates a
significant risk of harming that person, even if no harm results from the
172
173
174
175
176
177

Id. at 649.
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id. at 649.
Id. at 648.
Id. at 649.
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endangerment. 178 Numerous criminal statutes prohibit risk-creating
behaviors, including reckless endangerment, reckless driving, and
driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol. 179 A significant portion
of endangerment crimes involves prohibitions on expression, providing
yet another illustration of the proliferation of speech crimes. The
following subsections elaborate on two notable examples of excessive
criminalization of endangerment speech.
1.

Verbal Harassment

Many jurisdictions have adopted a wide array of criminal statutes
expansively prohibiting various forms of harassment. 180 Commentators
note that the term “harassment” has no unified legal definition and that
it covers different types of undefined misconducts, ranging from
stalking and cyberstalking (physically or virtually) that is following or
conducting surveillance of another individual, causing her fear for her
safety, to threats to a person or property, fighting words, or profanity. 181
Moreover, many criminal statutes fail to accurately define what
misbehaviors are encompassed in the term “harassment” by including a
residual subsection, which prohibits engaging in “any other course of
alarming conduct serving no legitimate purpose of the actor” if it is
done with purpose to harass another. 182 A comprehensive analysis of
harassment statutes and the challenges they present to both free speech
and criminal law doctrines exceeds the scope of this Article. 183 The
following discussion is, therefore, limited to one specific example of
178 See Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist
Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1762–63 (2010) (discussing the endangerment
justification).
179 See, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2705 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-103
(2013).
180 These statutes are typically modeled after the MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.4 (1980), which
prohibits the following:

A person commits a petty misdemeanor if, with purpose to harass another, he: (1)
makes a telephone call without purpose of legitimate communication; or (2) insults,
taunts or challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly
response; or (3) makes repeated communications anonymously or at extremely
inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language; or (4) subjects another to an
offensive touching; or (5) engages in any other course of alarming conduct serving no
legitimate purpose of the actor.
181 See Aaron H. Caplan, Free Speech and Civil Harassment Orders, 64 HASTINGS L.J. 781, 790–
92, 810–11 (2013) (discussing the scope of criminal harassment statutes).
182 Id. at 791–92 (noting that the drafters of the Model Penal Code enacted the residual
prohibition, preferring a vague and broader law rather than leaving unforeseen actions to go
unpunished).
183 For discussion of these harassment statutes, see generally Caplan, supra note 181 and
Eugene Volokh, One-to-One Speech vs. One-to-Many Speech, Criminal Harassment Laws, and
“Cyberstalking,” 107 NW. U. L. REV. 731 (2013).
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verbal harassment, often dubbed bullying in layman’s terms, which has
lately become the target of legislatures and courts. In particular, this
discussion excludes criminal statutes against cyberstalking and threats
often communicated in cyberspace, which are typically covered by
existing criminal statutes. 184 The latter inflict severe forms of emotional
and psychological harm and are beyond the scope of my critique here. 185
While the term “bullying” covers both traditional face-to-face
verbal harassment and cyberspace harassment, the discussion below
specifically aims at cyberbullying as a prominent facet of the broader
trend towards criminalizing speech-based harassment. The term
“cyberbullying” does not have an acceptable legal definition and it
encompasses a broad spectrum of speech disseminated via electronic
communication, ranging from threatening and harassing to annoying,
offending, gossiping, and name calling. 186 Given the absence of a legal
definition, this Article uses the term cyberharassment instead. In recent
years, the growing use of cyberspace communication to verbally harass
others has led to a host of legislative measures aimed at curbing the
problem of cyberharassment. 187 While the vast majority of states have
adopted civil measures, predominantly focusing on the liability of
schools for students’ bullying, several states have also criminalized
verbal harassment, explicitly clarifying that it includes
cyberharassment. 188 These jurisdictions have expanded their existing
criminal harassment laws above and beyond explicit threats of violence,
stalking, and traditional telephone harassment to also include various
acts of cybercommunication over a period of time, directed at a specific
person, that seriously alarm that person and would cause a reasonable
person to suffer substantial emotional distress. 189
Massachusetts provides a prominent example for a state that
passed such a law, with its “Criminal Harassment” statute proscribing
the following:

184 For a comprehensive discussion of these criminal prohibitions, see generally DANIELLE
KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE (2014).
185 See Danielle Keats Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 345, 361–74 (2014) (advocating the expansion of criminal sanctions to cover
cyberstalking and intentional infliction of harm); see also Naomi Harlin Goodno, Cyberstalking, A
New Crime: Evaluating the Effectiveness of Current State and Federal Laws, 72 MO. L. REV. 125,
125–35 (2007).
186 See Lyrissa Lidsky & Andrea Pinzon Garcia, How Not to Criminalize Cyberbullying, 77 MO.
L. REV. 693, 718 (2012) (noting various forms of verbal harassment).
187 See Volokh, supra note 183, at 741–42 (noting that most courts have upheld these laws); see
also Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 695–96.
188 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (2013); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 240.30 (McKinney
2014), invalidated by People v. Golb, 15 N.E.3d 805 (N.Y. 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§ 2709(a) (West 2013).
189 See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 700 (discussing various types of criminal
cyberharassment statutes).
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(a) Whoever willfully and maliciously engages in a knowing pattern
of conduct or series of acts over a period of time directed at a
specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would
cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress,
shall be guilty of the crime of criminal harassment . . . . The
conduct or acts described in this paragraph shall
include . . . electronic mail, internet communications, instant
messages or facsimile communications. 190

The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet examined the constitutionality
of any specialized criminal harassment statute. Commentators have
begun to criticize these statutes largely from the perspective of the First
Amendment. 191 However, criminal cyberharassment laws raise not only
free speech concerns but also insurmountable problems stemming from
substantive criminal law. First, these statutes are at odds with basic
tenets of the criminal law because they are typically overbroad and
vague. The statute adopted by the Massachusetts legislature criminalizes
a host of behaviors that are not specifically defined, potentially raising a
lack of fair notice problem. Grounding criminal liability on ambiguous
phrases, such as “conduct which seriously alarms” is particularly
problematic since it is unclear of what the actus reus of the crime
consists. Moreover, the phrase “alarm a person” is notably overbroad,
covering a wide range of speech that ought to be constitutionally
protected. Such indeterminate language introduces a dangerous degree
of uncertainty into criminal prohibitions, which ought to be clear and
definite. Furthermore, this term is so broad that determining its precise
scope also raises significant vagueness concerns. 192 Grounding criminal
liability on such equivocal notions limits individuals’ freedom of action,
resulting in a “chilling effect” that may cause them to abstain from
engaging in a host of permissible behaviors.
Second, criminal sanctions are not best suited to address the
complexities of cyberharassment and to curb its harms. Combating
cyberharassment requires changing prevailing social norms through the
education of teenagers about its injuries. Criminal law, however, is often
ineffective in fostering social change, being an inadequate means for
solving social problems. 193 While incarcerating teenagers for
cyberharassment sends an expressive societal message, there are less
drastic measures for conveying society’s condemnation of the

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (2013).
See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 698 (contending that criminal cyberharassment
laws are prone to overreaching, suppressing protected speech).
192 See Caplan, supra note 181, at 810–11 (discussing the vagueness of verbal harassment
statutes).
193 See Aya Gruber, Rape, Feminism, and the War on Crime, 84 WASH. L. REV. 581 (2009)
(discussing the shortcomings of criminal sanctions in fostering social change).
190
191
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phenomenon. Criminal sanctions are not suitable for accomplishing
such goals. 194
Criminalization is also problematic in light of the view that
prohibiting cyberharassment is justified, among others, as yet another
example of a risk-creation crime. Put differently, criminal statutes
against verbal harassment offer another salient example of
endangerment speech crimes. Characterizing cyberharassment as one
type of a prophylactic measure, aimed to prevent harm before it is
inflicted, warrants some further exploration, since it is a somewhat
novel idea, and has not been explored yet in existing legal literature.
Cyberharassment is typically viewed as a complete offense, inflicting
severe emotional harm on tormented individuals at the moment it is
committed. Ample studies suggest that cyberharassment causes serious
psychological trauma on young victims, ostensibly justifying the use of
various legal remedies. 195 However, the view that one type of harm
stemming from cyberharassment is the infliction of emotional distress
does not preclude the dual nature of the prohibition, and the
multifaceted understanding of the harms it targets. Viewed this way, the
criminal prohibition against cyberharassment may also be perceived as
one type of an endangerment offense. In other words, cyberharassment
is not only a complete offense but also is an inchoate crime that aims to
provide a prophylactic measure against the potential future risk of
young victims committing suicide. The criminal prohibition, thus,
targets not only the separate harm of infliction of emotional distress but
also the additional future danger that the devastating emotional effects
of the tormenting speech may lead victims to take their own lives.
Several reasons support the assertion that extending criminal
prohibitions on verbal harassment to include expanded forms of
cyberharassment statutes serves as yet another prophylactic measure
aimed at protecting minors from the risk of self-inflicted death. The first
lies with considering legislatures’ intents and motives in enacting these
prohibitions. A number of studies suggest that cyberharassment has
contributed to the suicides of many teenagers. 196 Some notable examples
include Phoebe Prince of Massachusetts, Megan Meier of Missouri, and
Tyler Clementi of New Jersey. 197 In response to several high-publicized
ostensibly bullying-related suicides, legislatures have adopted
194 See Ari Ezra Waldman, Tormented: Antigay Bullying in Schools, 84 TEMP. L. REV. 385, 437
(2012) (explaining why criminal anti-bullying statutes are unjustified).
195 See SAMEER HINDUJA & JUSTIN W. PATCHIN, CYBERBULLYING RESEARCH CTR.,
CYBERBULLYING: IDENTIFICATION, PREVENTION, & RESPONSE (2014), available at
http://cyberbullying.us/Cyberbullying_Identification_Prevention_Response.pdf.
196 See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 694 & nn.6 & 10.
197 See Naomi Harlin Goodno, How Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A
Model Cyberbullying Policy that Considers First Amendment, Due Process, and Fourth Amendment
Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 641, 645–47 (2011).

BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete)

1700

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

6/7/2015 12:27 PM

[Vol. 36:1667

excessively severe measures in an attempt to appear “tough on
bullying.” 198 The Massachusetts experience is illustrative. Phoebe Prince,
a Massachusetts fifteen-year-old girl, was subject to relentless taunts and
verbal assaults from fellow students at her high school, before she
hanged herself. 199 Prince’s suicide received national attention, creating a
media buzz and a major public uproar attributing the suicide to the
torturous bullying. 200 Shortly thereafter, Massachusetts adopted the
above specialized criminal harassment statute, designed to target the
perceived risk of suicide. 201 Criminal statutes against cyberharassment,
thus, rest on the assumption that there is a direct connection between
teenagers’ suicides and cyberharassment, and that criminalization
provides a preventive measure aimed at reducing the risks associated
with bullying’s fatal effects. 202
Second, considering the prevailing discourse around civil
harassment statutes suggests that the prophylactic value of these statutes
is a particularly dominant theme when civil harassment orders are
concerned. 203 Commentators note, for example, that the core of civil
harassment statutes should focus on protecting victims’ safety and
privacy. 204 But the notion of promoting victim’s safety underlies not
only civil harassment statutes but also criminal ones. Indeed, one of the
main purposes of criminal law is to promote individuals’ safety and
security and protect them against potential future harm, thus
supporting the claim that the endangerment rationale also plays an
important role in criminal statutes against cyberharassment. Finally,
comparing criminal prohibitions against cyberharassment to civil
regulation of discrimination-based harassment further buttresses the
argument that the criminal prohibition aims at a prophylactic measure.
The harms inflicted on victims of sexual harassment may be equally
devastating to those inflicted by cyberharassment, as both may cause
severe emotional distress on victims. 205 Sexual harassment in the
workplace and in academic institutions, however, is not criminalized
but instead treated under Title VII and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act
198 See Deborah Ahrens, Schools, Cyberbullies, and the Surveillance State, 49 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1669, 1696–97 (2012) (discussing legislative responses to suicides).
199 See Emily Bazelon, What Really Happened to Phoebe Prince?, SLATE (July 20, 2010, 10:13
PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2260952/entry/2260953.
200 See Jeff Glor, Cyberbullying Continued After Teen’s Death, CBS NEWS (Mar. 29, 2010, 7:26
AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/cyberbullying-continued-after-teens-death.
201 See Waldman, supra note 194, at 386–87.
202 Id. at 436–37.
203 See Caplan, supra note 181, at 853–54 (noting that the statutory language of civil
harassment provisions should focus on unconsented contact that cause fear for one’s safety and
intrusion into one’s privacy).
204 Id. at 829–31.
205 See Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Criminalizing Coerced Submission in the Workplace and
in the Academy, 19 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 409 (2010).
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of 1964. 206 Several explanations may be offered to account for the fact
that cyberharassment is often criminalized, while discrimination-based
harassment is not. First, sexual harassment typically affects adults while
cyberharassment typically affects minors who may be more vulnerable
and in greater need for the criminal law’s protection. A second
explanation may rest on the assumption that criminally prohibiting
cyberharassment also aims to prevent the potential risk of victims’
suicides, a risk that is notably absent in the discriminatory harassment
context.
Having established the assertion that criminal prohibitions on
cyberharassment serves as yet another prophylactic measure leads to the
contention that such use of the endangerment rationale exemplifies an
unwarranted trajectory toward expanding the scope of endangerment
speech crimes. To be sure, this Article’s critique of criminal
cyberharassment statutes nowhere suggests that cyberharassment is not
an extremely harmful conduct inflicting serious psychological injuries.
Contrary to several commentators who believe that the infliction of
emotional distress does not warrant criminalization, this Article does
not contend that this type of harm never justifies criminal
prohibition. 207 By contrast, it argues that inflicting severe emotional
harm is a serious injury that may justify the imposition of criminal
sanctions, in the appropriate circumstances. The following reasons,
however, demonstrate why, for the most part, cyberharassment is just
not one of the cases justifying criminal sanction.
First, criminalizing cyberharassment is in tension with criminal
law theory that generally rejects negligence as sufficient mens rea.208
Under contemporary criminal law, the default mens rea is typically
recklessness, thus requiring a conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of harm. 209 Commentators note that psychological
research shows that much crime is the product of normal adolescent
development and that adolescents often engage in common childhood
wrongdoing, making poorly-considered decisions due to their
susceptibility to negative influences and external pressures. 210
Perpetrators of cyberharassment are typically immature teenagers, often
not fully aware of the consequences of their risky behaviors. These
young perpetrators’ mens rea is ambiguous, typically falling short of
Id. at 410–11.
See Brenner & Rehberg, supra note 41, at 81–83 (rejecting criminalization of inflicting
emotional harm).
208 See Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern: A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88
CALIF. L. REV. 931, 932 (2000) (noting that negligence is typically insufficient for imposing
criminal liability).
209 Id. at 932–35.
210 See Kristin Henning, Criminalizing Normal Adolescent Behavior in Communities of Color:
The Role of Prosecutors in Juvenile Justice Reform, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 383, 385–87 (2013).
206
207

BUCHHANDLER-RAPHAEL.36.5.2 (Do Not Delete)

1702

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

6/7/2015 12:27 PM

[Vol. 36:1667

intent, awareness, or even conscious disregard of a substantial and
unjustifiable risk of inflicting substantial harm. Criminalizing
cyberharassment is thus grounded on a mens rea of negligence, which is
an unwarranted expansion of criminal liability.
Second, grounding criminal liability on the endangerment
justification raises insurmountable problems of causation. Arguably,
since an independent actor—the bullied victim—intervenes by causing
her own death, perpetrators cannot reasonably foresee this
consequence, as they often lack actual awareness that their behavior
would lead others to commit suicide. 211 Suicide is too remote and
unforeseeable a consequence of bullying. Proving the nexus between the
cyberharassment and the ensuing suicide beyond a reasonable doubt is
an impossible requirement to meet at a criminal trial.
Finally, criminal statutes against cyberharassment are unwarranted
because they are typically passed in response to public outcry exerting
political pressure on legislatures to provide harsh criminal sanctions on
bullying. 212 Commentators have long noted the role that strong
emotions—mainly fear, anger, and hatred—play in promoting
legislation aimed at solving pressing social problems. 213 Examples of
statutes that draw heavily on communities’ outrage include not only
cyberharassment but also terrorism and pedophilia, often leading to
similar concerns regarding the risk of overreaching. 214 Drawing solely
on the public’s emotional responses and need for vindictive measures
should not serve as justification for criminalization as such statutes are
often hastily drafted, without fully weighing the high costs of
criminalization against its limited benefits.
2.

Instructional Speech

Instructional speech consists of speech that gives people factual
information that can assist them in the commission of crimes. 215
Examples include the dissemination of information explaining how to
make bombs, cook methamphetamine, grow marijuana, and evade

See Waldman, supra note 194, at 431–33 (discussing causation problems).
See Ahrens, supra note 198, at 1696 (discussing the public’s outcry following teens’
suicides).
213 See Erik Luna, Criminal Justice and the Public Imagination, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 71, 74
(2009).
214 See Daniel M. Filler, Terrorism, Panic, and Pedophilia, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 345, 359–
63, 377–80 (2003) (discussing similar rhetoric used in terrorism and pedophilia cases that stem
from the public’s strong emotional responses to both problems).
215 See Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1095, 1097, 1103 (2005)
(noting that instructional speech also consists of information on how to commit other harmful
conduct such as torts).
211
212
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taxes. 216 Criminally instructional speech consists of two categories. First,
speech that results in the commission of a crime may be prosecuted
under aiding and abetting statutes. 217 Second, speech that has not yet
resulted in the commission of a specific crime, but creates a risk that a
crime might be committed in the future. 218 The U.S. Supreme Court has
not yet squarely confronted the scope of First Amendment protection in
instructional speech cases. 219 Many lower courts, however, uphold
instructional speech restrictions, noting that they do not implicate the
First Amendment. 220
Criminal prohibitions against instructional speech manifest yet
another example of overcriminalizing speech. The following case is
illustrative. In 1999, Congress passed an amendment to the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).
The amendment provides in pertinent part:
(2) Prohibition. It shall be unlawful for any person—
(A) to teach or demonstrate the making or use of an explosive, a
destructive device, or a weapon of mass destruction, or to
distribute by any means information pertaining to, in whole or in
part, the manufacture or use of an explosive, destructive device,
or weapon of mass destruction, with the intent that the teaching,
demonstration, or information be used for, or in furtherance of,
an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence . . . . 221

In United States v. Austin, the defendant was prosecuted under the
above-referenced statute for material posted on his website, titled “raise
the fist.” 222 The site expressed the defendant’s anarchist views and
included a “Reclaim Guide” with instructions for disrupting
International Monetary Fund and World Bank events. The guide, which
the defendant claimed not to have written himself but to have copied
from another website, contained sections on “Police Tactics and How
To Defeat Them” and “Defensive Weapons” that included bombmaking

Id. at 1096–97 (providing examples of information facilitating the commission of crimes).
See Leslie Kendrick, Note, A Test For Criminally Instructional Speech, 91 VA. L. REV. 1973,
1979 (2005).
218 Id.
219 Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993, 995 (2002) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the petition
for writ of certiorari).
220 Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 267 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Dahlstrom,
713 F.2d 1423, 1428 (9th Cir. 1983); United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842 (9th Cir. 1982);
United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619, 624 (8th Cir. 1978).
221 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2)(A) (2012).
222 United States v. Austin, No. CR-02-884-SVW (C.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2003); see also H. Brian
Holland, Inherently Dangerous: The Potential for an Internet-Specific Standard Restricting Speech
That Performs a Teaching Function, 39 U.S.F. L. REV. 353, 365–66 (2005); Brian McWilliams, FBI
Raid Silences Teen Anarchist’s Site, NEWSBYTES (Jan. 31, 2002, 12:15 AM),
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/raisethefist/msgs/newsbytes-2002-01-31.txt.
216
217
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instructions. Austin was convicted and sentenced to one year in federal
prison. 223
The Austin case demonstrates the risks of prohibiting expansive
categories of criminally instructional speech. By classifying viewpoints
posted on the Internet as criminally instructional speech, the statute
enables the criminalization of speech based merely on the possible
potential for harm flowing from its content, even if such harm is only
slightly probable. The broadly worded statute enables conviction even in
cases where there is no evidence that anyone is likely to use the
instructions or that the defendant intended for anyone to use them. The
use of the statute as applied to the defendant’s conduct in this case
violates his constitutional right to speak. 224 Prohibiting criminally
instructional speech may sometimes be justified to prevent the risks of
grave harms, thus making the statute facially constitutional. For
example, holding an individual criminally liable for providing another
with detailed instructions on how to commit suicide bombing,
intending that he commit a terrorist act, is uncontested, even if
eventually the bomb did not go off. However, criminalization ought to
be limited to cases where there is proof of the speaker’s dangerousness,
including his intent to assist in the commission of a crime, as well as
evidence demonstrating substantial probability that the speech might
facilitate the crime the speaker intended. 225 Since Austin was resolved in
a plea agreement, it remains unclear whether the government had
sufficient evidence to prove these requirements. 226
C.

Possession Crimes

The widespread use of cyberspace communication has resulted in a
notable increase in the availability of child pornography on the
Internet. 227 The acknowledgement that children are a vulnerable group
deserving unique protection has led to a uniformly severe legislative
response, consisting of not only statutes that criminalize the production
and distribution of child pornography, but also criminal sanctions on
privately possessing such materials. 228 In Osborne v. Ohio, the Court
223 See David Rosenzweig, Man Gets 1 Year for How-To on Explosives, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5,
2003, at B3.
224 This Article raises “as applied”—as opposed to facial—challenges to the speech-based
statutes at issue. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Commentary, As-Applied and Facial
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1321, 1321–22 (2000) (summarizing the
distinction between facial and as-applied challenges).
225 See Kendrick, supra note 217, at 2013.
226 Id. at 2013–14 (noting that too little information was available to evaluate the speech).
227 See Hessick, supra note 56, at 854–55.
228 See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10 (1990) (upholding prohibitions against private
possession of child pornography).
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held that possession of child pornography is not constitutionally
protected under the First Amendment, upholding criminalization based
on the endangerment rationale. 229 Possession of child pornography is
perceived as a risk-creating behavior, consisting mainly of three types of
risks. 230 First, child pornography fuels viewers’ sexual fantasies, which
can incite them to commit sexual offenses against children. 231 Second,
pedophiles use child pornography to “groom” children by convincing
them that having sex with adults is acceptable. 232 Third, possession of
child pornography both creates and supports a market for the material,
encouraging its further creation with the accompanying exploitation of
children. 233
The justifications for current laws’ harsh penalties on possession of
child pornography are highly disputed among social scientists. 234
Commentators suggest that existing empirical evidence fails to
conclusively establish a causal link between mere possession of child
pornography and actual contact offenses involving molestation of
children. 235 A detailed assessment of these arguments exceeds the scope
of this Article. For present purposes, suffice it to say that current child
pornography laws conflate different types of harms. The production and
distribution of child pornography involves the actual sexual abuse of
children, inflicting the most severe harms. The protection of children
from such irreparable injuries justifies the harshest criminal sanctions,
and this Article does not take issue with these statutes. The alleged
harms stemming from private possession of child pornography,
however, are much more ambiguous, given the lack of clear evidence
that there is substantial probability that viewing child pornography
leads to sexual offenses against minors.
But even assuming that severe criminal penalties on private
possession of child pornography are warranted, significant problems
remain concerning the enormous scope of child pornography
prohibitions and the precise definition of the images falling under it.
These statutes contribute to the overcriminalization of speech because
they often sweep within their reach innocuous materials that do not
harm children. The problem stems from the overbroad and vague
nature of these statutes. 236 The phrase “child pornography” is broadly
Id. at 111–12.
See Hessick, supra note 56.
231 Id. at 871.
232 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
233 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 759–61 (1982).
234 See Melissa Hamilton, The Child Pornography Crusade and Its Net-Widening Effect, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 1679, 1693–95 (2012) (discussing the controversy among social scientists).
235 Id. at 1715–16.
236 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 108–10, 112–14 (1990) (upholding the constitutionality of
an Ohio statute that makes it a crime to “possess[] or view[] . . . material or performance of a
229
230
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defined to cover not only actual sexual acts with children but also sexual
images of minors, involving mere nudity. 237 Take for example,
depictions of nudity in photographs and paintings, or sexualized images
of minors in popular culture and fashion magazines. 238 Arguably,
possessing such images does not implicate the above justifications for
banning possession of child pornography.
Furthermore, as suggested earlier, the overcriminalization of
speech stems not only from passing overbroad statutes, but also from
prosecutorial overreaching. 239 Existing child pornography statutes
enable prosecutors to further expand criminalization above and beyond
the traditional rationales justifying these prohibitions. One notable
illustration of such prosecutorial overreaching involves charging
teenagers for consensual sharing of sexually explicit photos via the
Internet or cell phones, commonly known as sexting. 240 The
dissemination of any sexual material involving minors technically falls
under the scope of child pornography laws. 241 Criminal charges brought
against adolescents for sexting each other, however, are often unjustified
because their behaviors fall short of risking actual abuse of children. 242
When two teenagers consensually exchange explicit photos of
themselves, none of the justifications for criminalizing possession of
child pornography is present since the rationale of protecting an
innocent child from an adult sexual predator is absent. Prosecuting
sexting, thus, often results in charging adolescents with crimes even
though their conduct does not amount to criminal wrongdoing. 243 In
light of the devastating effects of a criminal conviction on an
adolescent’s future, stemming from the host of collateral consequences
following conviction such as the “sex offender” label, the dangers of
overcrminalizing this type of speech are disconcerting. 244
minor who is in a state of nudity . . . and where the person depicted is neither the child nor the
ward of the person charged” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
237 See 18 U.S.C. § 2256(2)(A) (2012) (federal definition of child pornography, which
constitutes visual depictions of actual children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, including,
“(i) sexual intercourse . . . ; (ii) bestiality; (iii) masturbation; (iv) sadistic or masochistic abuse; or
(v) lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of any person”).
238 Osborne, 495 U.S. at 128, 131 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (warning that the statute’s overbroad
language enables the criminalization of “[p]ictures of topless bathers at a Mediterranean beach,
[or] teenagers in revealing dresses”).
239 See supra Part I.
240 See Erik Luna, Prosecutorial Decriminalization, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 785, 804
(2012).
241 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763–64 (1982) (discussing the definition of child
pornography).
242 See Stephen F. Smith, Jail for Juvenile Child Pornographers?: A Reply to Professor Leary, 15
VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 505, 513 (2008).
243 See Luna, supra note 240 (noting that adolescents are often prosecuted under child
pornography laws even though they “might not appreciate that such behavior can be criminal”).
244 See Nora V. Demleitner, Abusing State Power or Controlling Risk?: Sex Offender
Commitment and Sicherungverwahrung, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1621, 1626 (2003); see also Dr.
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II. THEORIES EXPLAINING THE ABSENCE OF FIRST AMENDMENT SCRUTINY
The preceding Part demonstrates that the federal government and
the states adopt numerous statutes that prohibit various forms of
speech. At first blush, this finding may seem surprising in light of
common perceptions concerning the scope of free speech protections
under the Constitution. Conventional wisdom holds that the Court’s
First Amendment jurisprudence is strongly protective of speech. 245
However, a closer look at the speech crimes discussed above illustrates
that this generalization is inaccurate. The false assumption concerning
the allegedly broad protection of speech obscures current criminal law’s
trajectory, which is, in reality, far less protective of speech than many
commentators assume. 246 The following subparts explain why First
Amendment doctrines fail to cover a host of speech crimes.
A.

Speech Act Doctrines and Their Critique

Constitutional theorists have long identified a division between
speech and conduct, noting that the First Amendment protects the
former but not the latter. 247 Thomas Emerson has contended that while
expression and action are always mingled and most conduct involves
both, the “predominant element” in a course of conduct can be
identified and First Amendment thereby determined. 248 Speech is
presumptively beyond governmental regulation when it possesses
communicative qualities, expressing thoughts, ideas and viewpoints. 249
In contrast, conduct implicates little or no communicative value thus
not triggering any First Amendment considerations and enabling the
government to regulate it to effectuate significant interests such as harm
prevention. 250

JoAnne Sweeny, Do Sexting Prosecutions Violate Teenagers’ Constitutional Rights?, 48 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 951, 955 (2011) (noting that the Court has not yet ruled on the constitutionality of these
prosecutions).
245 See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (striking down a content-based
restriction on speech).
246 But cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Lecture, Not a Free Speech Court, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 733–34
(2011) (noting that the Roberts Court is not a speech-protective court).
247 See THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970).
248 Id. at 80–86 (explaining the doctrinal distinction between speech and conduct).
249 See Edward J. Eberle, Hate Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in America, 29
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135, 1194 (1994) (noting the theoretical and philosophical justifications
for protecting speech).
250 Id.
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Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct

The 1949 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Giboney v. Empire
Storage & Ice Co. stands for the proposition that the right to free speech
under the First Amendment does not protect speech used as an integral
part of conduct in violation of a criminal statute. 251 The decision
concerned the constitutionality of a Missouri law criminalizing “any
pool,
trust,
agreement,
combination,
confederation
or
understanding . . . in restraint of trade or competition in the
importation, transportation, manufacture, purchase or sale of any
product or commodity.” 252 The state attempted to use the law to enjoin
union members from peaceful picketing carried on as an essential part
of a course of conduct in violation of state law. 253 The Court affirmed
the conviction, holding that
It rarely has been suggested that the constitutional freedom for
speech and press extends its immunity to speech or writing used as
an integral part of conduct in violation of a valid criminal
statute. . . . [I]t has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of
speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because
the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means
of language, either spoken, written, or printed. 254

Courts have often cited Giboney to justify a wide variety of
restrictions on speech, including criminal statutes on conspiracies,
solicitation, aiding and abetting, and more. 255 The “speech integral to
criminal conduct” exception has been used to target conduct that is
viewed as specific tools used for the purpose of causing harm. 256 For
example, one court relied on Giboney in allowing liability for publishing
a book that describes how to commit contract murder. 257 Giboney’s
exception, however, has not received any doctrinal articulation in more
recent U.S. Supreme Court cases; the Court merely cites Giboney to
support its decisions refusing to protect certain types of speech, without

Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498–99 (1949).
Id. at 491 n.1.
253 Id. at 491–92.
254 Id. at 498, 502.
255 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1283 n.22. While the distinction between speech and conduct
is not limited to the criminal context, this Article focuses solely on criminal prohibitions on
speech because of the nexus between the overcriminalization of speech argument and doctrines
grounded in speech acts. See also Schauer, supra note 19, at 1766–67, 1801–02 (noting that both
civil and criminal statutes implicate various restrictions on speech, requiring legislatures to draw
the line between the communicative and noncommunicative elements of certain acts).
256 Giboney, 336 U.S. at 498; see also Volokh, supra note 21, at 1283.
257 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
251
252
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providing guidelines on the scope of the exception. 258 Scholarly
treatment of Giboney has also proved unhelpful in clarifying its scope as
commentators have not developed a coherent doctrinal framework
grounded in this exception. 259
Given the difficulties in determining the distinction between
speech and conduct, most commentators now recognize the fallacy of
such division, arguing that definitively categorizing every behavior as
either “speech” or “conduct” is not a feasible task. 260 Words are often the
exclusive means of prohibited forms of conduct, and conversely,
conduct often expresses viewpoints and ideas. 261 As John Hart Ely has
noted, expressing political protest against the government often takes
both the form of action and of speech and, therefore, attempts to
determine which element “predominates” necessarily call for judgments
about whether the activity should be protected. 262 Commentators
conclude that the “speech-conduct” distinction is unable to distinguish
between speech that warrants free speech protection and one that does
not. 263 Instead, commentators have endeavored to develop an
alternative analytical framework to determine which speech ought to be
subject to First Amendment scrutiny. 264
2.

Generally Applicable Laws

One doctrinal account attempting to explain which types of speech
justify criminal sanction relies on the “generally applicable laws”
argument. 265 Speech should not be constitutionally protected when a
generally applicable law that restricts all conduct that has similar
harmful effects covers the prohibited behavior. 266 This speech may be
criminalized because “it is the act by which one either violates an
independent criminal prohibition,” seemingly referring to prohibitions
unrelated to speech, “or facilitates the violation of such a prohibition.” 267
For example, publishing a book with the intent to help readers commit a
258 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978); Searle v. Johnson, 646
P.2d 682, 685 (Utah 1982).
259 See Morrison, supra note 116, at 901–03 (noting the absence of a coherent doctrine).
260 See Ely, supra note 27, at 1495–96 (noting that the distinction invites sophism and ad
hocery).
261 See Dan M. Kahan et al., “They Saw a Protest”: Cognitive Illiberalism and the SpeechConduct Distinction, 64 STAN. L. REV. 851, 856 (2012).
262 See Ely, supra note 27, at 1496.
263 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284.
264 See Ely, supra note 27, at 1495–96.
265 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1281.
266 Id. at 1281–82 (noting that some commentators suggest that “generally applicable laws
should be treated as content-neutral restrictions”).
267 Susan W. Brenner, Complicit Publication: When Should the Dissemination of Ideas and
Data Be Criminalized?, 13 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 273, 392 (2003); see id. at 377–78.
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crime is punishable under generally applicable aiding and abetting law
because this speech is simply the means of committing a criminal
offense or the evidence of the crime. 268
A slightly different variation of this account draws on the Court’s
seminal decision in United States v. O’Brien. 269 O’Brien concerned a
man who burned his draft card as part of a public antiwar protest, and
was convicted under a federal law prohibiting the intentional
destruction of Selective Service registration certificates. 270 The O’Brien
Court announced the following three-element test to determine when
the state may ban speech: “[(1)] if [the statute] furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; [(2)] if the governmental interest is
unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [(3)] if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 271
The O’Brien test sets a key distinction in First Amendment
jurisprudence between content-neutral and content-based restrictions
on speech. 272 Speech consisting of expressive conduct may be restricted
because of harms flowing from its noncommunicative component,
which is content-neutral. Examples include the destruction of Selective
Service system, obstruction of traffic, and noise violations. 273 However,
speech may not be restricted because of harms flowing from its
communicative component, which is content-based, unless these
restrictions fall under one of the recognized exceptions to free speech
such as incitement, threats, and obscenity, or pass the strict scrutiny
test. 274
Relying on O’Brien, courts and commentators focus their attention
on the government’s motives in regulating speech. 275 If the
government’s motives may be independently grounded on justifications
unrelated to speech, then the criminal ban passes constitutional
scrutiny. But if the government’s motives are related to the suppression
of disfavored messages and silencing political dissent, the statute fails
strict scrutiny review. 276 Under this account, generally applicable laws
should be treated similarly to content-neutral restrictions on expressive

See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243 (4th Cir. 1997).
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
270 Id. at 369.
271 Id. at 377.
272 Id. at 382 (noting that the restriction implicates only the noncommunicative impact of the
conduct).
273 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1278.
274 Id. at 1284.
275 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in
First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 413, 427–32 (1996); Kahan et al., supra note 261, at
856–57; Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 775–77.
276 Kahan et al., supra note 261, at 885–87 & n.127.
268
269
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conduct, and thus should be upheld under O’Brien as speech restrictions
that are incidental to the law’s overall thrust. 277
The problem with the “generally applicable laws” doctrine,
however, is that it enables criminalization of content-based restrictions
on speech without subjecting them to First Amendment scrutiny. 278 As
the examples in Part I demonstrate, the speech at issue there is
criminalized based on its communicative message, namely, because its
content informs, persuades, or offends others, and because of the harms
that flow from this informing, persuasion, or offense. Yet, the “generally
applicable laws” doctrine excludes First Amendment analysis from
many speech restrictions even though they target speech precisely
because of the content that speech communicates. Criminalizing speech
based on its content is in tension with the O’Brien test, under which
speech cannot be restricted because of the harm that flows from its
content unless it passes strict scrutiny. 279
Moreover, generally applicable prohibitions cannot be upheld as
facially content-neutral when they are content-based as applied. 280
When the prohibition is triggered based on the harm stemming from
the content of the speech, First Amendment scrutiny should apply. 281
Instead of relying on the “generally applicable laws” standard, the
relevant question that ought to determine the scope of free speech
protection should be whether the statute at issue prohibits speech
because of the harm that flows from its content. 282 When a statute
punishes speech because the harms are caused by the persuasive,
informative, or offensive elements of the opinions expressed, that
statute should be treated as a content-based restriction on speech and
therefore subject to full-fledged First Amendment scrutiny. 283
Furthermore, the usual free speech considerations should apply here,
including mainly the type of harm that speech may cause, the value of
the speech and the risk that the restriction would create a chilling effect,
resulting in prohibiting permissible forms of speech. 284
An additional drawback of the “generally applicable laws” doctrine
is that the government’s motives have only limited relevance in
assessing the constitutionality of speech restrictions. The examples set
forth in Part I illustrate that the government’s motives for regulating
speech appear perfectly legitimate and unrelated to suppressing political
See O’Brien, 391 U.S. at 382; see also Volokh, supra note 21, at 1281–83 & nn.13, 15–18.
See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1287.
279 Id. at 1284.
280 Id. at 1284–87.
281 Id.
282 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18–19 (1971) (holding that the law was directed at Cohen
because of the offensive content of his message).
283 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284–87.
284 Id. at 1339.
277
278
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dissent. 285 Legislatures often have ample bases for adopting generally
applicable prohibitions and there is no basis for suspecting that they had
any impermissible motivation with regard to suppressing speech. 286 For
example, aiding and abetting statutes are motivated by promoting social
goods that can be defined independently of the government’s hostility to
disfavored ideas. 287 But even when legislatures’ motivations are not
grounded on impermissible considerations, the result of adopting
generally applicable prohibitions is often sweeping among others
content-based restrictions on speech. 288 Statutes should, therefore, be
presumptively unconstitutional when applied to speech based on its
content, regardless of whether they are well motivated and benign.
These may be upheld only if they pass strict scrutiny review, just as is
the case for statutes that on their face adopt content-based restrictions.
3.

The Theory of Communicative Action

Lawrence Solum’s 1989 paper draws on the theory of
communicative action to explain which speech warrants First
Amendment protection and which does not. 289 The theory, which was
developed by German philosopher Jurgen Habermas, distinguishes
between communicative action, oriented at the coordination of
behavior through rational agreement, and strategic behavior, in which
speech is used to manipulate, coerce, or deceive. 290 Solum suggests that
the theory of communicative action be used to demarcate the boundary
between speech that warrants constitutional protection and speech that
does not. 291 Under this theory, the First Amendment freedom of speech
is interpreted as the freedom to engage only in communicative action.
Therefore, the First Amendment protects only communicative action
while strategic action remains unprotected speech. 292 For example, the
freedom of communicative action theory encompasses a right to
advocate violent revolution because rational consensus on the
legitimacy of the government use of force cannot be accomplished if
advocacy of illegal conduct is prohibited. 293 In contrast, strategic action
is aimed at affecting others, not through the achievement of agreement
See supra Part I.
See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1301–03.
287 See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 242–45 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Kahan et al.,
supra note 261.
288 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284–85.
289 See Lawrence B. Solum, Freedom of Communicative Action: A Theory of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 54, 55–56 (1989).
290 Id. at 91.
291 Id. at 106.
292 Id. at 107–09.
293 Id. at 122.
285
286
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and understanding, but rather through means such as deception,
coercion, and manipulation, thus underserving free speech
protection. 294 The distinction between communicative and strategic
action explains the exclusion from First Amendment protection of a
wide variety of strategic actions. Since strategic action includes speech
acts that are beyond the scope of protection of the First Amendment, a
probability assessment is not required in examining the
constitutionality of the speech restriction, which may be upheld “even if
the danger [posed by the speech] is fuzzy and remote.” 295
While the communicative action theory offers some important
insights that explain the distinction between speech that warrants free
speech protection and speech that does not, the theory is insufficient to
account for more contemporary contexts that have arisen since it was
first articulated in the 1980s. First, the communicative action theory
precedes some recent changes, both in technological advancements such
as the enormous spread of cybercommunication as well as challenges
stemming from the emergence of new threats such as terrorism. Second,
the main problem with the distinction between communicative and
strategic action is that the vast majority of speech acts share the
characteristics of both strategic and communicative action, thus
drawing a clear line between them is impossible. 296 For example, the
theory is unable to determine whether terrorist speech that encourages
violent terrorist attacks would be classified as predominately
communicative or predominantly strategic, as such speech often
contains both elements, aiming at achieving understanding among
listeners as well as manipulating listeners. Third, another drawback in
this theory is that determining that communicative action is protected
speech does not resolve the more difficult question concerning the
extent of the right at issue. 297 Granted, there are certain circumstances
that outweigh the right to engage in communicative action, but the
theory does not elaborate on these limits. As Solum concedes, even
though certain types of speech, such as advocacy of unlawful action, fall
under the communicative action rubric, this speech might still be
restricted if the communicative action is likely to lead to harmful
strategic action which cannot be prevented by other means. 298
Therefore, the distinction between communicative and strategic action
provides only the first step in evaluating the constitutionality of the
speech. The necessary additional step in this inquiry must include a
probability test, assessing the likelihood of future harm stemming from
294
295
296
297
298

Id. at 107.
Id. at 108.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 122.
Id. at 122–23.
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the speech at issue. The theory of communicative action does not
provide any mechanism for assessing this likelihood.
4.

Situation-Altering Utterances

An elaborate doctrinal explanation for the absence of free speech
protection from many speech acts is developed in Kent Greenawalt’s
book, Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language. 299 Greenawalt
distinguishes between “assertions of fact and value,” which are
statements about the way things are or should be, and are entitled to full
First Amendment protection, and “situation-altering utterances,” which
are ways of doing things, changing the world by altering normative
obligations, and are not entitled to First Amendment protection. 300 The
latter category includesamong othersoffers, agreements, orders,
permissions, and threats, which are tantamount to conduct and are
subject to civil and criminal regulation. 301 Greenawalt identifies four
factors that may explain the circumstances under which the First
Amendment applies: (1) speech that is public rather than private; (2)
speech that is inspired by the speaker’s desire for social change rather
than for private gain; (3) speech relating to something general rather
than to a specific transaction; and (4) speech that is normative rather
than informational in content. 302 Conversely, these factors explain the
absence of free speech coverage in circumstances where the speech is
face-to-face, informational, particular, and for private gain.
Greenawalt’s theory, however, is also unable to provide a sufficient
conceptual framework that explains the absence of First Amendment
scrutiny from the speech crimes discussed in Part I. One problem with
this theory for today is that it is dated and does not account for the vast
changes that have occurred since it was formulated in 1989. These
changes include a significant increase in the scope of speech offenses, in
the terrorism context as well as in other areas. 303 These changes also
consist of technological advancement affecting the nature of speech,
mainly the enormous explosion in the use of the Internet as a primary
form of speech. These legal and technological changes are not
considered in Greenawalt’s proposed factors for distinguishing between
protected and unprotected speech. For example, the spread of
cyberspace communication has significantly blurred Greenawalt’s
distinction between face-to-face communication and a general appeal to
See GREENAWALT, supra note 22.
Id. at 43–44, 57.
301 Id. at 43–44, 57–58.
302 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1801 (summarizing the four factors that Greenawalt has
offered).
303 See supra Part I.A–C.
299
300
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the public at large. Much speech in today’s virtual world, however,
consists of expression that is publicly available on the Internet, reaching
unidentified audience. Greenawalt’s theory fails to explain why a
publication on the Internet, providing information on how to commit
crimes may be criminalized even though this speech is targeted towards
the public at large rather than towards a specific perpetrator.
B.

Categorical Exclusion as Coverage and Its Critique

Professor Frederick Schauer has offered a broader framework for
considering speech falling outside the boundaries of the First
Amendment. 304 Schauer’s analysis first distinguishes between free
speech protection and free speech coverage. 305 The question of coverage,
argues Schauer, consists of a preliminary inquiry asking whether an
event that involves “speech” in the ordinary use of the word presents a
First Amendment issue. 306 Although the First Amendment broadly
refers to “speech” much speech remains completely uncovered by it. 307
Only once the First Amendment covers certain type of speech, the
question of its protection comes into play. 308 Schauer notes that
numerous verbal acts such as criminal solicitation, criminal conspiracy,
and other forms of verbal participation in and facilitation of crime do
not present any First Amendment inquiry. 309 Importantly, under this
account, the entire class of speech acts is categorically excluded from
First Amendment scrutiny. Since whole categories of speech crimes lie
well beyond the boundaries of the First Amendment, the arsenal of
protections provided by free speech doctrines do not show up in the
analysis. 310
Schauer further contends that no single theory or doctrinal
principle explaining the First Amendment coverage has yet been
found. 311 The explanation for the lack of free speech coverage, argues
Schauer, lies not only in legal doctrine. 312 Instead, it lies in the
combination of doctrines and a complex array of nonlegal, nondoctrinal
factors, including political, cultural, and economic considerations

304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312

See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1766–68.
Id. at 1769.
Id.
Id. at 1771.
Id. at 1769.
Id. at 1801.
Id. at 1769.
Id. at 1785–86.
Id. at 1787.
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determining which speech the First Amendment covers and which it
does not. 313
There are, however, several problems with this approach. First, it is
mostly descriptive rather than proscriptive. Describing numerous forms
of speech as uncovered by the First Amendment with only a small
portion of speech subject to strict scrutiny review says little with respect
to the normative question of whether speech acts should be subject to
First Amendment analysis. Schauer’s account does not explain whether
the categorical exclusion of First Amendment scrutiny from all speech
acts is indeed a proper approach from a normative perspective.
Moreover, while the theory unfolds the broad political and institutional
reasons for subjecting certain speech to First Amendment scrutiny, it
does not provide a separate scheme consisting of legal criteria for
distinguishing between different types of speech.
The categorical exclusion account also lacks practical utility
because of its indeterminate nature. This theory falls short of offering an
analytical framework that would be able to draw, in advance, a
principled legal boundary between speech that warrants free speech
protection and one that does not. This account thus leads to
inconsistent outcomes, and are unable to explain why some
communicative messages are subject to free speech protections, while
others are restricted even though both types of speech may result in
harmful consequences. Take, for example, the different legal treatment
of hate speech and harassing speech. Hate speech, including racist
expressions, falls within the boundaries of the First Amendment even
though it is clearly harmful, inflicting emotional distress on victims. 314
In contrast, verbal harassment, another type of harmful speech inflicting
emotional distress on victims, falls outside the scope of First
Amendment coverage and is subject to civil and criminal regulation. 315
Second, the categorical exclusion account precludes the use of any
balancing mechanisms to evaluate the constitutionality of specific
examples of speech acts. One of the key distinctions in First
Amendment jurisprudence is the division between categorization and
balancing. 316 Balancing approaches weigh individuals’ interests in
asserting a right against the government’s interests in regulating it and
determine which interest ought to prevail in a specific case. 317 In
contrast, categorization prohibits this kind of weighing of interests in
Id. at 1787, 1800–01.
See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382–84, 391 (1992).
315 See Lidsky & Garcia, supra note 186, at 695–96 (discussing criminalization of
cyberharassment).
316 See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second Amendment Analysis,
84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 383–84 (2009) (discussing the distinctions between categorization and
balancing).
317 Id. at 381.
313
314
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individual cases by inquiring only whether the case falls into certain
predetermined, outcome-determinative lines. 318
Contemporary First Amendment opinions use the rhetoric of
balancing of interests rather than categorically excluding entire classes
of speech from First Amendment coverage. 319 Commentators thus agree
that the balancing approach has generally prevailed, largely replacing
categorization as the preferred mode of First Amendment protection. 320
A notable exception to this general preference is current law’s treatment
of speech acts, which is still grounded in a categorical approach. 321 As
Part I illustrates, entire classes of speech acts are currently categorically
excluded from First Amendment scrutiny. No balancing tests are used
when suppressing speech in a given case falling under the speech act
classification, regardless of the specific circumstances underlying the
specific speech.
The main problem with this categorical exclusion is that it is overinclusive. It precludes First Amendment scrutiny from specific speech
acts that do carry communicative messages and, thus, might warrant
free speech protection. Casting entire categories of speech crimes
outside the First Amendment’s ambit, based solely on the prohibition’s
classification, impede a more nuanced, case-by-case examination of
whether a particular conspiracy, instructional speech, or verbal
harassment warrants criminal sanction. This wholesale exclusion fails to
distinguish between various degrees of harm stemming from different
types of speech. For example, the sexting prosecutions discussed above
demonstrate that free speech protection is categorically precluded even
from nonharmful expressions, since they fall under an uncovered
category. 322 In contrast, a balancing approach weighs “competing
interests in maintaining free and open expression on the one hand
[while] assuring security and preventing [harm] on the other.”323 A
typical strict scrutiny analysis applies such a balancing process, enabling
courts to assess whether in specific cases individuals’ liberty to express
certain messages should outweigh others’ right not to be harmed by the
speech’s potential outcomes. Balancing, therefore, provides a muchneeded flexibility by allowing courts to evaluate the costs and benefits
underlying a particular speech on a case-by-case basis.
Id.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 23, at 779 (noting that contemporary First Amendment opinions
are loaded with the rhetoric of balancing).
320 See Blocher, supra note 316, at 386 (noting that balancing is the preferred mechanism in
First Amendment jurisprudence).
321 Id. at 386–88 (observing that no balancing is needed in a given case for categories such as
fraud or crime facilitating speech, which are entirely outside the bounds of free speech).
322 See supra Part I.C.
323 See Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of
the McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 9, 17–18 (2004).
318
319
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Third, the categorical exclusion approach does not account for a
host of free speech justifications underlying many speech acts.
Categorical exclusion is premised on the assumption that speech acts
implicate none of the theoretical rationales for protection therefore their
regulation does not raise any serious First Amendment problems. 324
This assumption, however, is false. As the examples discussed in Part I
demonstrate, many speech acts in fact consist of clearly communicative
messages and as such they do implicate important justifications for First
Amendment protection.
Consider for example, a website consisting of instructions on how
to cultivate marijuana plants in one’s backyard. While the U.S. Supreme
Court has not yet resolved the question of the constitutionality of crime
facilitating speech, legislatures often assume that such speech may be
subject to criminal sanction. 325 Excluding free speech considerations
from all types of crime facilitating speech, however, is highly
problematic if the actual purpose behind the publication is not to
advocate any illegal action but instead to promote political change
concerning the legal regulation of privately growing marijuana.
Expressing politically motivated viewpoints by peacefully advocating
legal change is the core justification behind free speech protection and,
therefore, should be subject to First Amendment scrutiny. This
ideologically grounded speech touches upon ample First Amendment
concerns, most notably individuals’ liberty to freely express viewpoints
that are disfavored by the government.
C.

The Link Between Existing Doctrines and Overcriminalization of
Speech

The doctrines discussed above are directly responsible for the
overcriminalization of speech for the following reasons. First, exposing
the expansive scope of criminal statutes that are not touched by the First
Amendment sharpens the fact that the speech with which the First
Amendment deals is the exception, while the speech that may routinely
be criminally prohibited is the general rule. 326 The speech that the First
Amendment ignores based on speech acts doctrines includes countless
areas of content-based criminal prohibitions on speech. Among them
lies the vast domain of criminal law dealing with conspiracy,
324 See Kent Greenawalt, “Clear and Present Danger” and Criminal Speech, in ETERNALLY
VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH IN THE MODERN ERA 97, 111 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds.,
2002).
325 See Volokh, supra note 215, at 1128–30 (noting that no Supreme Court case addresses
crime-facilitating speech directly, but legislatures assume that this speech may be punished).
326 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1784 (“[T]he speech with which the First Amendment is even
slightly concerned is but a small subset of the speech that pervades every part of our lives.”).
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solicitation, attempt, crime facilitation, and verbal harassment. 327 Those
numerous speech offenses are precisely the crimes identified in Part I as
contributing to the overcriminalization of speech. If these widely
accepted restrictions on speech become the rule, the inevitable upshot is
criminalizing too much speech.
Second, since no single doctrine explains when speech falls within
the coverage of the First Amendment, legislatures are granted unlimited
discretion to enact an array of criminal statutes as they see fit. The
reason for lawmakers’ unconstrained power is twofold. First,
substantive criminal law is predominantly not constitutionalized. 328
Constitutional law places very few constraints on the definition of
crimes, with limited exceptions concerning speech that is covered by the
First Amendment, consensual sexual practices, and reproductive
rights. 329 Scholars have long suggested that constitutional scrutiny ought
to be applied to substantive criminal law. 330 The criminal law, however,
has not yet developed significant constitutional doctrines for checking
legislative action. The practical implications of this reality are crucial
because different types of judicial review are applied to speech based on
its categorization. Speech that is categorized as falling within the
boundaries of the First Amendment is subject to strict scrutiny review
that imposes much greater burdens than the highly deferential scrutiny
of rationality review. 331 The vast majority of speech restrictions that are
measured against the stringent strict scrutiny review are struck down. 332
By contrast, speech acts categorically fall outside the scope of First
Amendment coverage, thus they are not measured against the
demanding strict scrutiny analysis. 333 Instead, they are subject only to
rational basis review, the lowest level of judicial scrutiny. Under this
test, the government only needs to demonstrate that the statute at issue
is “rationally related” to a “legitimate” governmental reason offered as
its justification—a standard that is easily satisfied. 334 Statutes typically

327 Id. at 1801 (“[N]umerous verbal acts stand far outside the purview of the First
Amendment.”).
328 See Markus Dirk Dubber, Toward a Constitutional Law of Crime and Punishment, 55
HASTINGS L.J. 509, 510 (2004) (noting that substantive criminal law is predominantly not
constitutionalized).
329 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 123–24 (observing that most criminal statutes implicate
nonfundamental rights and thus are subject only to rational basis review).
330 See Dubber, supra note 328, at 529–31 (advocating for constitutional constraints on
criminal statutes).
331 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1770.
332 See Sherry F. Colb, Freedom from Incarceration: Why is this Right Different from All Other
Rights?, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 781, 822 (1994) (noting that statutes typically fail strict scrutiny
review).
333 See Schauer, supra note 19, at 1801–02.
334 FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14, 314 n.6 (1993) (applying rational basis
review).
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pass that scrutiny, which is very deferential to the government. 335 The
upshot is that speech crimes that are measured against the lenient
rational basis review are almost always upheld, therefore directly
contributing to the overcriminalization of speech.
An additional reason explaining legislatures’ unconstrained
discretion stems from the fact that substantive criminal law is not
grounded in a comprehensive theory. 336 Scholars note that there are no
conceptual boundaries to criminalization or clear criterion limiting the
scope of criminal statutes. 337 Substantive criminal law, they further note,
is not grounded on a coherent framework under which criminalization
decisions are based solely on harmful, fault-based culpable conducts. 338
Moreover, the concept of harm itself eludes definition, allowing
criminalization without proof of injury or wrongdoing. 339 The upshot of
the lack of a comprehensive theory of criminalization is that legislatures
often succumb to political pressures by enacting statutes that satisfy
their constituents’ demands. 340 In the absence of a theory that
constraints legislatures’ crime creation choices, the problem of
overcriminalization of speech is further exacerbated.
D.

An Alternative Framework for Considering Speech Acts

A notable alternative analytical framework to assess the
constitutionality of speech crimes lies in Eugene Volokh’s work. 341
Volokh rejects the doctrines that are currently used to preclude First
Amendment consideration from many speech crimes. 342 As an
alternative to relying on speech acts doctrines, Volokh proposes that all
speech crimes be subject to full-fledged strict scrutiny review. 343
Determining whether any given speech crime warrants constitutional
protection, Volokh argues, requires an examination of factors usually
considered under a typical First Amendment inquiry, such as the value
of speech and the harm that it causes. 344 For example, in an attempt to
335 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 574, 578 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (remarking
on the leniency of rational basis review).
336 See Darryl K. Brown, Can Criminal Law Be Controlled?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 971, 972–73
(2010) (reviewing DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW
(2008)).
337 Id. at 971–72 (discussing the absence of a comprehensive theory underlying
criminalization).
338 Id.
339 Id. at 971.
340 See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 529–30.
341 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1284.
342 Id. (rejecting prevailing explanations for excluding free speech protection from many
speech crimes).
343 Id.
344 Id. at 1338–39.
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consider an independent analytical framework for determining the
constitutionality of crime-facilitating speech, Volokh considers possible
distinctions within this specific category, which would distinguish
between protected and prohibited forms of crime-facilitating speech. 345
Providing information that is helpful in the commission of a crime,
contends Volokh, generally ought to be constitutionally protected
unless several limited circumstances apply (when the speech is “said
to . . . a small group of people [and] the speaker knows [that they] are
likely to use the information for criminal purposes[; when the speech]
has almost no noncriminal value[; or when] it can cause extraordinarily
serious harm”). 346
Volokh’s contribution provides an important starting point for
further exploration of the idea of subjecting all content-based speech
crimes, regardless of the category into which they currently fall, to First
Amendment scrutiny. Volokh himself recognizes that his proposal only
outlines the task of delineating the proper constitutional boundaries of
speech offenses, and that a considerable amount of work remains to be
done. 347 The next Part takes up that call to engage in an analytical
undertaking that would better draw the line between speech that
warrants protection and one that does not.
III. A PROPOSAL FOR LIMITING THE SCOPE OF ENDANGERMENT SPEECH
CRIMES
The following proposal advocates the adoption of several
constraints to limit the criminalization of speech.
A.

External and Internal Constraints on Criminalizing Speech

Considering a broader conceptual framework that would limit the
scope of criminalization in general, Douglas Husak advocates the
adoption of both external and internal constraints on criminal
statutes. 348 These external constraints draw on existing constitutional
doctrine of judicial review, while the internal constraints draw on
criminal law theory itself. 349 The following proposal builds on Husak’s
general framework by applying it to the specific area of endangerment
speech crimes.

345
346
347
348
349

See Volokh, supra note 215, at 1104–06.
Id. at 1106.
Volokh, supra note 21, at 1286.
See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 64–67.
Id. at 128–32.
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The first key feature of this Article’s proposal to limit the scope of
endangerment speech crimes calls for extending strict scrutiny review to
all of these crimes, including those currently viewed as speech acts that
are categorically excluded from First Amendment coverage. The
proposal substitutes a specialized case-by-case balancing of competing
interests underlying specific speech crimes for existing categorical
exclusion of free speech coverage based on labeling many types of
speech as “speech act.”
Part II elaborates on the arguments justifying the application of
strict scrutiny review on all speech crimes. 350 To reiterate the main
points made above, the speech crimes discussed in Part I prohibit
speech because of the harm that flows from its content, namely, because
of its communicative element. When speech is restricted because the
message it conveys informs, advocates, or persuades others, these
restrictions are content-based and, similarly to other fundamental
rights, they ought to be subject to full-fledged strict scrutiny review. 351 A
typical First Amendment analysis engages in a balancing process
between the value of a given speech and the harm it inflicts. 352 A similar
balancing process should also be used to evaluate the constitutionality of
all speech crimes, including those currently excluded from First
Amendment scrutiny. This balancing should take into account the
factors that are generally applicable under a typical First Amendment
analysis, such as the magnitude of the harm, the value of speech, and the
risk that punishing speech would deter constitutionally protected
speech. 353
Endangerment speech crimes, however, demonstrate why applying
only external constitutional constraints may prove insufficient to limit
their scope. First Amendment doctrines do not lend themselves to
drawing a legal line between behaviors that warrant criminal bans and
those that warrant only civil restrictions, such as tort actions,
injunctions, or administrative measures. 354 Typically, under a First
Amendment analysis, bans on speech are either upheld or rejected,
without carving out distinctions between criminal and civil
restrictions. 355 First Amendment scrutiny applies similar standards of
review to both types of restrictions without suggesting that the
See supra Part II.A.
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (citing R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992)).
352 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 519, 524–25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (suggesting
that free speech demands weighing of the competing interests).
353 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 1339 (noting factors generally applicable in a First
Amendment scrutiny).
354 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan (N.Y. Times v. Sullivan), 376 U.S. 254, 277 (1964). But cf. Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 710–11 (1931).
355 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 277.
350
351
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government might enjoy less constitutional leeway when regulating
speech through criminal means. 356 In light of this feature of the First
Amendment, constitutional constraints on criminalization of
endangerment speech crimes must be supplemented with internal
constraints.
The proposed limits on endangerment speech crimes should also
include several internal constraints stemming from criminal law theory.
Professor Husak proposes that these constraints consist of the following
factors: criminalization is justified only when criminal statutes target
nontrivial harms or evils, 357 address only wrongful conduct, 358 impose
punishment only on offenders who deserve it, 359 and carry a heavy
burden of proof justifying them. 360 While Husak’s proposal outlines an
overall framework for limiting the scope of criminalization in general,
he also examines several constraints on risk-creation offenses. 361
Husak’s theory, however, does not recognize that notable examples of
risk-creation offenses include speech crimes, and thus his analysis does
not separately consider these offenses. As the preceding parts
demonstrate, endangerment speech crimes raise additional concerns
stemming from the fact that they prohibit speech based on the harm
that flows from its content. The distinct problems arising from the
criminalization of speech are unaccounted for in Husak’s proposal. The
following proposal seeks to fill this gap by developing constitutional
constraints specifically designed for endangerment speech crimes. In
what follows, this Article will separately consider factors that should be
incorporated into strict scrutiny analysis and those that ought to shape
internal criminal law constraints.
1.

Relevant Factors to Structure Strict Scrutiny Analysis

This subsection articulates a framework for considering the
constitutionality of endangerment speech crimes by offering several
guidelines to structure judicial inquiry into the elements of a strict
scrutiny analysis.
a. A Probability Test: Substantial Probability of Harm
A key factor in evaluating the constitutionality of endangerment
speech crimes should consist of a judicial inquiry into the probability of
356 See Michael Coenen, Of Speech and Sanctions: Toward a Penalty-Sensitive Approach to the
First Amendment, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 991, 1007 & n.72 (2013).
357 See HUSAK, supra note 9, at 65–66.
358 Id. at 66.
359 Id. at 82–83.
360 Id. at 83–84.
361 Id. at 159–70 (addressing limits on risk-creation crimes).
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harm that may flow from the content of the speech at issue. To satisfy
strict scrutiny analysis, I propose that the government be required to
establish a clear nexus between the speech in question and the
likelihood of harm. More specifically, the government would have to
demonstrate that given the content and the context of the speech it
wants to ban, there is a substantial probability that the speech would
result in grave harm. Requiring such probability test is necessary
because criminal sanctions are unjustified in circumstances where
speech merely creates a remote possibility or mere tendency for future
harm. A probability test thus ensures that only dangerous perpetrators
are held criminally liable for their speech.
The probability test advocated here draws on existing probability
standards already in use under free speech doctrines. The Court
currently employs one probability mechanism in an important line of
cases concerning violence-inducing speech. 362 The doctrines embodied
in these cases incorporate what commentators refer to as “probability
thresholds.” 363 A “probability threshold” sets a predefined lower
boundary on how likely a potential harm must be in order for that harm
to be assessed in the constitutional analysis. Under this inquiry, courts
will not engage in balancing the benefits of speech against the possible
harm from that speech in those cases in which the likelihood of harm is
so low that the probability that it would occur does not cross the
minimum threshold. 364 The Brandenburg decision discussed above is
the prime example of the Court’s application of “probability
thresholds.” 365 Recall that incitement doctrine requires, among others,
that the speech be likely to incite violence—an explicit probability
threshold that eliminates from consideration all low-probability
harms. 366
While inciting speech is subject to a demanding probability test,
probability assessments are currently not incorporated into the Court’s
strict scrutiny analysis, which lacks an explicit doctrinal probability
component. 367 The cases discussed in Part I exemplify the implications
of the absence of a probability test. 368 These examples demonstrate that
courts do not impose any bars against asserting extremely lowprobability harms as the basis for suppressing various forms of
expression. Criminal prohibitions on speech acts are often based on
questionable predictions of dangerousness, without requiring any
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
See Jonathan S. Masur, Probability Thresholds, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1293 (2007).
364 Id. at 1297.
365 Id. at 1307.
366 Id. at 1306.
367 See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 33–38 (applying heightened scrutiny
without discussing the probability of harm).
368 See supra Part I.A–C.
362
363
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likelihood that the speech would result in any harm. 369 In the absence of
a probability requirement, mere tendency to cause harm or an increase
in the propensity of violence suffice for enacting numerous speech
crimes. 370 The ultimate result of refusing to incorporate any probability
test as a threshold condition for criminalizing these types of speech is
the overcriminalization of speech.
Speech restrictions in the terrorism context best illustrate the risks
of a failure to include a probability requirement for evaluating the
constitutionality of a specific speech crime. As previously noted, while
the HLP Court noted that the speech in question increases the
probability of a future terrorist attack, it did not require substantial or
high likelihood that such grave harm to national security would
ensue. 371 The refusal to incorporate a probability test is particularly
problematic in the national security context due to what Cass Sunstein
dubs “probability neglect”: the tendency among policy makers to
disregard probability assessments when making decisions under
indeterminate conditions. 372 This type of bias, the argument continues,
is especially prominent when considering the probability of events that
trigger the public’s strong emotional responses, e.g., terrorism. 373
Several factors explain how the importance of low-probability threats is
exaggerated. First, the government tends to inflate the risks of lowprobability speech it attempts to suppress. Second, individuals tend to
overvalue the danger of low-probability risks, and finally, dreadful
threats such as terrorism trigger much stronger responses compared to
low-probability risks in other contexts. 374 The examples discussed in
Part I demonstrate that criminal prosecutions often draw on the public’s
strong emotional response to what it perceives as dire dangers especially
in the areas of terrorism and speech endangering minors including
sexual expression and cyberharassment.
Several commentators have considered incorporating probability
assessments into strict scrutiny review. 375 One commentator suggests
that probabilities may be examined when asking whether the restriction

369 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.2(a) (1980) (proscribing the creation of “public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm,” if a person, with intent or recklessness, in any public place
engages in conduct having a direct tendency to cause acts of violence).
370 See supra Part I.A–C.
371 See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 4–6.
372 See Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE
L.J. 61, 62–70 (2002).
373 Id. at 83–85, 94–95.
374 See Masur, supra note 363, at 1298.
375 See, e.g., Stephen A. Siegel, The Death and Rebirth of the Clear and Present Danger Test, in
TRANSFORMATIONS IN AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF PROFESSOR MORTON J.
HORWITZ 211, 220–23 (Daniel W. Hamilton & Alfred L. Brophy eds., 2009); Richard H. Fallon,
Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1330 (2007).
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is narrowly tailored, especially if asking whether it is overinclusive. 376
Alternatively, other commentators suggest that probability assessments
may be considered as part of the inquiry whether the state interest is
sufficiently compelling. 377 Under both accounts, to satisfy the strict
scrutiny review, the government would be required to establish a much
stronger causal link between the speech in question and the future harm
before it can criminalize speech. 378 Drawing upon these ideas, this
Article proposes that probability assessments be incorporated into a
strict scrutiny review of all speech crimes. As of yet, the Court has not
adopted a probability threshold as part of its strict scrutiny analysis.
Having established the significance of probability assessments, the
next question is what level of probability should be required. Alternative
probability tests range from the highest level of probability, requiring
near certainty or very high likelihood, to a less demanding test requiring
substantial probability, culminating in the far more lax “reasonable
consequences” standard.
Brandenburg’s “high likelihood” test has proved an extremely
onerous, if not impossible, threshold to satisfy. 379 This test fails to take
into consideration the distinct dangers that terrorism-related speech
poses. 380 It also fails to account for the enormous proliferation of
cyberspace communication. Extending the Brandenburg test to
additional contexts is, therefore, unwarranted. To curb significant risks
of future harm, falling short of satisfying the “high likelihood”
requirement, the Brandenburg test’s stringent elements should be
relaxed by adopting an alternative probability test.
A much less demanding standard, however, such as one grounded
in “reasonable consequences,” should also be rejected. When speech
only reasonably increases the chances of some future harm, criminal
sanctions are unjustified for the following reasons. First, this lax
standard is inconsistent with the Court’s current application of
probability thresholds in the incitement context under which criminal
restrictions on speech may be upheld only when harms reach a
substantial level of probability. Second, a “reasonable consequences”
requirement is in tension with the special status that speech enjoys
under the First Amendment. The premise underlying contemporary
free speech jurisprudence is that American society is willing to tolerate
low-probability risks by setting a high threshold for restricting
Fallon, supra note 375.
See Siegel, supra note 375, at 220.
378 Cf. Erik Luna, Essay, The Bin Laden Exception, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1489, 1493–95 (2012)
(discussing risk assessments in the terrorism context and considering the likelihood and
consequences of given threats).
379 See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN. ST. L. REV. 539, 570 (2006).
380 See Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, What is War?: Reflections on Free Speech in
“Wartime,” 36 RUTGERS L.J. 833, 848–51 (2005); Healy, supra note 51, at 726.
376
377
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potentially injurious speech. 381 The lenient “reasonable consequences”
test falls short of satisfying this standard.
Lastly, considering other areas of law where personal freedoms
may be abridged based on some probability assessments further
demonstrates that reasonable suspicion or mere chance of harm are
typically insufficient to justify the encroachment on individual
freedoms. The Fourth Amendment context is illustrative. It provides
individuals with the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, requiring that
warrants to search and seizure shall be issued only upon probable
cause. 382 While the Court has never explicitly defined the term, it has
held that “probable cause” means a “substantial chance” or “fair
probability,” and that it is more than reasonable suspicion but less than
a “more likely than not” standard. 383
The substantial probability standard offers a middle ground
between the rigid high likelihood test and the lax “reasonable
probability” one. Under the proposed test, the state would not be able to
satisfy the strict scrutiny’s compelling interest prong if it is unable to
demonstrate that there is substantial probability that the speech in
question would result in grave harm. The test thus ensures that
individuals would not be punished for speech falling short of substantial
likelihood of serious harm. But is also ensures that while a real and
significant prospect of harm is necessary, this requirement falls short of
high likelihood, which under Brandenburg has evolved into near
certainty.
One critical component of the substantial probability test is
assessing the specific context against which the speech is expressed.
Probability tests typically rely on the content of speech to judge its
potential for harm. 384 The underlying context under which the speech is
disseminated, however, should play a crucial role in evaluating the
likelihood of harm. Relevant factors that a probability assessment must
account for include the identity of speakers, their role among the
community, and their influence over listeners among the general public
or specific individuals. 385 Some speakers, mainly political and religious
leaders, may have significant influence over their ideological supporters.
See Masur, supra note 363, at 1297.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
383 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 243 & n.13 (1983).
384 See Moshe Cohen-Eliya & Gila Stopler, Probability Thresholds as Deontological Constraints
in Global Constitutionalism, 49 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 75, 97–98 (2010); see also Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are
used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”).
385 See Susan Benesch, Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide, 48 VA.
J. INT’L L. 485, 521 (2008).
381
382
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Speech expressed by a Jewish rabbi, a Muslim imam, or a Christian
minister has a potentially much greater effect compared to that of a
layperson. The form and degree of the speaker’s influence among
listeners thus help fact-finders determine the dangerousness of a given
speech.
b. The Magnitude of the Harm
The nature and severity of the harm that the speech may cause
should also be a considered when assessing the constitutionality of
endangerment speech crimes. Generally speaking, criminal law’s
purpose is to prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts
or threatens grave harm on others. 386 Endangerment speech crimes,
however, often enable criminalization based merely on inflicting trivial
or minimal harm or even no harm at all because their definitions do not
require that the prohibited behavior result in grave harm. 387 The dated
offense of public drunkenness is illustrative of the implications of the
absence of this element. 388 This offense has been traditionally defined as
“the appearance of a person who is under the influence of drugs or
alcohol in a place open to the general public.” 389 The justification for the
offense was based on the risk stemming from the perpetrator’s rowdy
behavior, consisting mainly of various forms of speech and
expression. 390 The Georgia statute, for example, targets speech that is
“boisterousness, by indecent condition or act, or by vulgar, profane,
loud, or unbecoming language.”391 Other jurisdictions, however,
criminalize appearance only to the degree that it may endanger the
perpetrator or other persons or property or annoy persons in the
defendant’s vicinity. 392 Importantly, these prohibitions extend above
and beyond behaviors that endanger actual harm to others to cover
behaviors that merely offend or annoy others. Criminalization of public
Cf. MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt. 44 (1980).
See supra Part I.
388 Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 530, 535 (1968) (affirming conviction under public
intoxication law).
389 United States v. Francisco, No. CR 06-1015 JB, 2008 WL 2367253, at *4 (D.N.M. Feb. 1,
2008) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 663 (7th ed. 2000)); see, e.g., IOWA CODE § 123.46(2)
(2011); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-47 (West 1971); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-388 (West 2014); W.
VA. CODE § 60-6-9(a)(1) (1999); see also United States v. Garcia-Sandobal, 703 F.3d 1278 (11th
Cir. 2013) (discussing the scope of these statutes).
390 See, e.g., Martin v. State, 662 S.E.2d 185, 187–88 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008) (upholding conviction
of defendants under public drunkenness statutes for boisterous behavior in public places
involving different forms of speech and expression); Ridley v. State, 337 S.E.2d 382, 383–84 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1985) (same). On trends towards decriminalizing public drunkenness, see Darryl K.
Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 242–43 & nn.98–99 (2007).
391 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-41 (West 2014).
392 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1315 (West 2014); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5505
(West 2014); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.02 (West 2014) (proscribing being intoxicated in
public to the degree that a person may endanger himself or others).
386
387
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drunkenness is, therefore, based on conduct merely giving offense to
others, falling short of risking grave harm. 393 The criminalization of
public drunkenness, despite only risking either trivial/minimal harm or
mere offensiveness, provides yet another illustration of the overlooked
problem of overcriminalizing speech.
The Court’s existing jurisprudence further enables criminalization
of speech without proof of grave harm. 394 For example, the Brandenburg
test rejects a sliding scale approach, requiring high likelihood that the
speech would lead to any law violation, regardless of the magnitude of
its harm. 395 The Court adheres to a “probability thresholds” approach,
under which the magnitude of harm is not taken under consideration. 396
When low-probability, high-magnitude dangers speech is concerned,
the Court does not engage in a cost-benefit analysis, which balances
between competing interests, including the gravity of the harm.
In contrast with the Court’s approach, commentators note that an
alternative position that predominates both within the academy and
among the lower courts is a cost-benefit analysis. 397 This approach
requires courts to balance the cost of dangerous speech—the harm that
the expression is likely to cause if it is allowed—against the benefits one
might expect the speech to produce. Speech warrants First Amendment
protection only if its benefits outweigh its costs. 398 Proponents of using
cost-benefit analysis to decide free speech cases concede that the
magnitude of the harm is a key factor in such analysis. 399 For example,
under a cost-benefit analysis the devastating harms of terrorism are a
substantial cost that often outweighs the benefits of terrorism-related
speech. Since the magnitude of harm inflicted by terrorism is so
enormous, this factor heavily tips the scale towards precluding free
speech protection, provided that the evidence demonstrates substantial
likelihood of such harm.
Here, this Article advocates the application of a cost-benefit
analysis to measure the constitutionality of all endangerment speech
crimes. This approach would balance between competing interests by
taking into consideration, among others, the magnitude of the harm.
Under the proposal, the state would satisfy the “compelling interest”
requirement only if it proves that the speech it wants to ban risks not
393 See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW: HARM TO OTHERS 26
(1984) (defining the offense principle).
394 See Jed Rubenfeld, Comment, A Reply to Posner, 54 STAN. L. REV. 753, 758 & n.23 (2002).
395 See Larry Alexander, Redish on Freedom of Speech, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 593, 597–98 (2013)
(contrasting Brandenburg’s approach with Judge Learned Hand’s position that requires lower
probability for more serious harms than for less serious harms).
396 See Masur, supra note 363, at 1309.
397 Id. at 1296.
398 Id.
399 See RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 360–61 (2003).
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just any harm but grave harm. A cost-benefit analysis would require the
judge to determine the approximate probability that a potential speechborne threat will materialize, estimate the magnitude of the damage that
threat might cause, multiply the probability and magnitude to arrive at
the expected outcome of permitting the speech to occur and then
compare this outcome with the benefit that the judge expects the speech
to confer. 400 Importantly, incorporating the magnitude of the harm
requirement into a cost-benefit analysis cuts both ways. On one hand, it
ensures that the risk of merely minimal or trivial harm is insufficient to
justify criminalization of endangerment speech crimes. On the other
hand, however, it also ensures that the greater the potential harm that
may flow from the speech is, the more compelling interest the
government has to criminalize that speech.
c. Least Restrictive Means
Another factor for evaluating the constitutionality of
endangerment speech crimes is whether a criminal sanction, as opposed
to less drastic forms of regulation, is the least restrictive means to satisfy
the government’s compelling interest to ban a given speech.
Commentators have long noted that criminal law is the strongest formal
condemnation society can impose on individuals. 401 It is a stringent
weapon, capable of inflicting the harshest and most intrusive sanctions,
subjecting defendants to numerous collateral consequences. 402 Criminal
law should, therefore, be used selectively and discriminately and only as
a last resort when alternative and less restrictive sanctions fail. 403
Modern legislation often attempts to appear “tough on crime” and
provide “quick fixes” to what the public perceives to be pressing
problems by adopting harsh criminal sanctions. 404 This often results in
hasty legislative responses, substituting excessive use of the blunt
criminal law for more moderate regulation. The upshot is that
criminalization often serves as a first, rather than a last, resort in
curbing harmful conduct. 405
The above legislative trend further contributes to the proliferation
of endangerment speech crimes. Criminalizing cyberharassment is a
400 See Masur, supra note 363, at 1296 (explaining the components of the cost-benefit
formula).
401 See Dubber, supra note 328, at 546.
402 See Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999) (noting the collateral
consequences of punishment).
403 See Douglas Husak, The Criminal Law as Last Resort, 24 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 207, 211
(2004).
404 See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 529–31.
405 See Nils Jareborg, Criminalization as Last Resort (Ultima Ratio), 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 521,
523 (2005).
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case in point, as broadly worded prohibitions raise serious doubts as to
whether these offer the least restrictive means to address its harms.
Arguably, less intrusive measures, mainly civil and administrative
remedies, including common law tort actions such as intentional
infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy, and defamation, as
well as injunctions, may suffice and be more effective in curbing the
injuries of cyberharassment. 406 While a civil ban on cyberharassment
may pass strict scrutiny review by satisfying the least restrictive means
requirement, a criminal ban may fail to do so because civil measures
offer less restrictive means to curtail this harmful speech. 407
2.

Internal Constraints on Criminalizing Speech

As previously suggested, strict scrutiny review alone is insufficient
to draw the legal boundary between speech that warrants criminal
sanction and one that does not. 408 The following factors, which stem
from criminal law theory, provide additional limits on the scope of
endangerment crimes.
a. The Perpetrator’s Dangerousness
Establishing the defendant’s dangerousness is a key factor in
limiting the scope of endangerment speech crimes. Speech becomes
more dangerous as the gravity of the potential harm increases. When
the harm threatened is not sufficiently serious, the speech is not
dangerous enough to justify criminalization. Moreover, a defendant’s
dangerousness may be defined in terms of the likelihood that her
conduct will inflict harm. 409 Speech becomes more dangerous when
there is substantial probability that it would result in harmful conduct.
The dangerousness requirement is, thus, closely linked to the above
constitutional constraints. But the essential role that dangerousness
assessments play in the criminal justice system calls for a separate
discussion of this requirement.
Dangerous determinations cut across the criminal justice system,
prominently featuring in various stages of the criminal process. 410
Examples of situations in which the government engages in
406 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 710–12 (1931). But cf. Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr.,
Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764–66 (1994).
407 Cf. Near, 283 U.S. at 715–16 (implying that the Constitution enables the distinction
between permissible criminal and civil laws against libel on one hand and impermissible prior
restraint of a publication).
408 See supra Part III.A.
409 See Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Factors on
Which Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. REV. 283, 285–87 (1988).
410 See Slobogin, supra note 33, at 1–2.
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dangerousness assessments include investigative stops by the police,
pretrial detention, noncapital sentencing, and death penalty
determinations. 411 Dangerousness evaluations, however, also play a
more tacit role in the realm of substantive criminal law, mainly with
respect to inchoate crimes. The function of conspiracy law’s overt act
requirement and attempt law’s substantial step requirement is to
demonstrate the defendant’s dangerousness. 412 The premise underlying
these requirements is that a perpetrator becomes dangerous only by
transforming plans and thoughts into real action.
Demonstrating the perpetrator’s dangerousness becomes more
challenging in cases where criminalization is grounded on speech alone,
unaccompanied by tangible action. As previously noted, legislatures
often criminalize risk-creating speech without requiring evidence of the
perpetrator’s dangerousness. 413 Prosecutors in turn bring charges for
mere speech, absent of proof of the defendant’s dangerousness. 414 These
trends, thus, result in diluting the significance of the dangerousness
element. By insisting that criminalization of speech is contingent on
clear proof of the perpetrator’s dangerousness, the proposal advocated
here reinvigorates the role that the dangerousness requirement must
play in all endangerment speech crimes.
b. Distinguishing Criminal Wrongdoing from Civil Harm
Another constraint on the criminalization of speech calls for a
more principled distinction between conduct appropriately targeted
through criminal law and one better targeted through civil measures.
Current law often proves unsuccessful in drawing a meaningful line
between these two types of regulation. This shortcoming may be traced
to an ambiguity concerning the notion of criminal harm. In recent
years, the harm principle has arguably become the main justification for
criminal prohibitions. 415 The term harm itself, however, is so elusive
that it escapes a unanimous definition. 416 Over the years, expansive
harm definitions have enabled legislatures to use this principle to justify
a myriad of criminal prohibitions. 417 While originally the harm
principle was perceived as a tool to limit the scope of criminal statutes, it
Id.
See Larry Alexander & Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Danger: The Ethics of Preemptive Action, 9
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 637, 644 (2012) (discussing the dangerousness requirement).
413 See supra Part I.
414 United States v. Gladish, 536 F.3d 646, 648 (2008) (elaborating on the significance of
proving the defendant’s dangerousness).
415 See Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 131–32 (1999) (discussing the triumph of the harm principle).
416 See Brown, supra note 336, at 971.
417 See Harcourt, supra note 415, at 139–40 (explaining how the harm principle justifies
criminal statutes).
411
412
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now serves to expand the scope of criminal regulation. 418 The upshot of
the overbroad definition of harm is that the criminal justice system
conflates criminal and civil harms.
To some theorists, the prevention of harm is a sufficient basis for
criminalization. 419 Others, however, insist that in addition to inflicting
harm, an act should also have offended a moral wrong. 420 While the
notion of harm cuts across injuries addressed both in civil and in
criminal law, it is simply an inadequate measure for evaluating whether
criminal regulation is warranted. A distinct tenet of criminal harm is
that it stems from a morally wrongful and blameworthy conduct. 421
Civil harm, by contrast, does not hinge on culpable behavior.
Criminalizing endangerment speech is often inconsistent with
these fundamental requisites. The case of verbal harassment is again
illustrative. As previously suggested, using criminal sanctions to address
the harms of cyberharassment is unwarranted in light of the numerous
problems they create. 422 Constitutional constraints, however, would not
suffice to limit criminalization because the grave harms inflicted by
cyberharassment may justify civil remedies that might satisfy the First
Amendment’s least restrictive means requirement. While I concede that
verbal harassment may inflict severe emotional harm, I also contend
that this type of injury is typically not a criminal harm, therefore calling
for a civil rather than a criminal sanction. Indeed, the intentional
infliction of emotional harm is a recognized cause of action under tort
law. 423 Additional constraints must include not only serious harm but
also normatively wrongful conduct justifying criminal sanction. The
latter requirement may be lacking with respect to adolescents’
cyberharassment, where awareness of the elements of the offense is
often absent. For these behaviors, civil sanctions may be more
appropriate for achieving the goals of harm prevention.
c. Intent to Inflict Harm
A final limit that draws a clearer distinction between criminal and
noncriminal harm is proof that the perpetrator intended to inflict harm,
or at least demonstrated willful blindness to the risk of causing harm.
While intent is already a fundamental element of attempts and
conspiracies, it is not a requisite element of all endangerment speech
crimes. Take, for example, the offense of disorderly conduct in public
See Steven D. Smith, Is the Harm Principle Illiberal?, 51 AM. J. JURIS 1, 14 (2006).
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books 1974)
(1859).
420 See MICHAEL S. MOORE, PLACING BLAME: A THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 649 (2010).
421 See FEINBERG, supra note 393, at 116–18.
422 See supra Part I.B.1.
423 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1965); see also Benjamin C. Zipursky, Snyder v.
Phelps, Outrageousness, and the Open Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011).
418
419
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places, broadly proscribing various forms of behaviors, many of which
are grounded solely in speech, arguably as a means to prevent the
disturbance of public order. 424 In Tobey v. Jones, a person was charged
with disorderly conduct after he had removed his clothes when
requested by Transportation and Security Administration agents to
submit to enhanced screening at the airport, in order to expose the text
of the Fourth Amendment, which he had written on his bare chest. 425
Tobey claimed that he was protesting against the government’s practice
of enhanced screening, which he believed to violate his constitutional
rights. 426 Notably, the offense’s elements may be satisfied not only upon
proof that the defendant intended to create a risk of public
inconvenience, annoyance, or alarm, but also upon proof that he
recklessly created such risk. 427
Evaluating the firmness of defendants’ intent is of particular
significance in endangerment speech crimes because of the oftenambiguous nature of speech. A defendant may engage in speech that
threatens future harm without intending that others engage in conduct
that ultimately inflicts the harm. Since individuals may abandon their
risky endeavors even at the last moment, criminalization of
endangerment speech ought to be limited only to cases where the
defendant’s intent has already risen to the level of firm resolution to
inflict harm. Merely taking a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
speech would result in harm should not suffice to uphold
criminalization.
Moreover, since criminalizing speech may be warranted when
speech is aimed at leading others to commit crimes, evidence should be
required to prove that the defendant intended to influence the listeners’
conduct, as opposed to their attitudes and beliefs. 428 Criminalizing
speech is unjustified if the speaker’s expression only aims at affecting
others’ ideas. While such speech may contribute to an atmosphere of
violence, changing people’s attitudes in itself is insufficient to justify
criminalization. 429

424 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 10-201 (West 2014); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415
(West 2014) (proscribing disorderly conduct).
425 See Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379 (4th Cir. 2013).
426 Id. at 383–84. The attorney for Henrico County then dropped the charge. Id. Tobey sued
the agents and police officers, and the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit accepted the
argument that his action stated a cognizable First Amendment claim. Id.
427 See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-415 (West 2014) (stating that liability may be based on a mens
rea of recklessness).
428 See Miriam Gur-Arye, Can Freedom of Expression Survive Social Trauma: The Israeli
Experience, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 155, 179 (2003) (noting the difference between affecting
attitudes and behaviors).
429 Id. at 177 (rejecting criminalization based on the creation of an atmosphere of violence).
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A Test Case

Heinous crimes of mass violence under International criminal law
provide a powerful test case for applying the proposed constraints. The
purpose of turning to this specific context is twofold: first, to
demonstrate that even in the area of genocide, the most horrific type of
mass atrocities, endangerment speech does not always justify
criminalization. Second, to offer an analogy between the large-scale
effects of genocide and those of terrorism by suggesting that similar
constraints should be applied in both areas.
Genocidal slaughter of the minority Tutsi by the majority Hutu
was committed in 1994 in Rwanda, massacring between 500,000 and
800,000 Rwandans. 430 Several individuals were criminally charged in the
International Tribunal for Rwanda for incitement to commit
genocide. 431 Among them was Simon Bikindi, an immensely popular
Rwandan pop singer, and an extremist Hutu, who was charged based on
two speech-related events. One count stemmed from an incident in
which Bikindi rode in a truck with a loudspeaker, in an area where
Tutsis have been massacred, urging militant Hutu to kill all surviving
Tutsis. 432 Another count alleged that Bikindi composed, performed,
recorded, or disseminated musical compositions extolling Hutu
solidarity, and characterizing Tutsi as enslavers of the Hutu. These
compositions were subsequently deployed in a propaganda campaign to
target Tutsi as the enemy and to instigate, incite, and encourage the
Hutu population to separate themselves from the Tutsi and to kill
them. 433 The songs were disseminated at political rallies, radio
broadcasts, pre-killing meetings, and Bikindi’s public speeches. 434
The International tribunal convicted Bikindi for incitement to
genocide based only on his ride with the loudspeaker, reasoning that it
amounted to direct call to Hutu militants to commit genocidal acts
against individual Tutsis. Importantly, the tribunal acquitted Bikindi of
the songs-based count, holding that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that Bikindi composed the songs with specific intent to incite the
killings. 435

430 See Mark A. Drumbl, “She Makes Me Ashamed to Be a Woman”: The Genocide Conviction
of Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, 2011, 34 MICH. J. INT’L L. 559, 560 (2013).
431 See Benesch, supra note 385, at 489.
432 See Gregory S. Gordon, Music and Genocide: Harmonizing Coherence, Freedom and
Nonviolence in Incitement Law, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 607, 620–21 (2010).
433 Id. at 618–19.
434 Id. at 617.
435 See Benesch, supra note 385, at 493 (“[T]reaty law instructs only that to commit [the crime
of] incitement to genocide: [(1)] one must have specific intent to cause genocide, and [(2)] the
incitement must be direct and public.” (footnote omitted)).
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To consider the application of the above proposal on Bikindi’s
case, let us first frame the case in the context of American law by
assuming that there was jurisdictional authority to prosecute Bikindi. It
is reasonable to assume that in most jurisdictions, jurors would have
convicted Bikindi of solicitation of murders or aiding and abetting these
crimes based both on the truck ride event and on disseminating the
songs. 436
Applying the proposed limits on Bikindi’s two speech-based
charges would have resulted in conviction with respect to the truck ride
event but in acquittal with respect to the inciting songs. As for the
former charge, Bikindi would have been rightly convicted for explicitly
calling to kill Tutsis because given the content and the context of his
direct instruction to militants, there was a substantial probability that
his call would result in genocidal acts. The basis for this conclusion rests
with incorporating a probability assessment into the speech at issue. The
magnitude of the harm—genocidal murders—plays an important role in
a cost-benefit analysis of Bikindi’s speech because the costs of such
speech clearly outweigh its benefits. Moreover, a direct call to militants
to engage in genocidal acts demonstrates Bikindi’s dangerousness and
his intent to cause genocide of Tutsis.
In contrast, under the proposal Bikindi would likely not have been
convicted for disseminating these songs for the following reasons. First,
the government would have likely been unable to prove that there was
substantial probability that the artistic expression of national sentiments
would ensue in genocidal acts. Admittedly, the songs amounted to hate
speech, consisting of abhorrent messages against Tutsi. But even the
prosecution characterized them only as “songs [extolling] Hutu
solidarity” rather than direct calls for the killing of Tutsis. 437 Second,
communicating extremist solidarity messages by an artist would have
likely failed to prove Bikindi’s dangerousness. Third, the evidence
would have likely failed to establish Bikindi’s intent to cause the
genocide. Finally, even the suspect context, allegedly supporting
conviction—given the facts that genocide had already occurred and
Bikindi enjoyed immense influence among extremists—would have
been insufficient to prove that the songs were likely to incite genocide.
In sum, the guidelines provide a principled analytical framework for
assessing the constitutionality of speech crimes, ensuring consistent
outcomes in future cases.

436 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 373 (2012) (prohibiting solicitation to commit a crime of violence);
CAL. PENAL CODE § 653f (West 2014) (prohibiting the solicitation of commission of certain
offenses).
437 See Gordon, supra note 432, at 619.
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CONCLUSION
This Article has identified endangerment speech crimes as yet
another example of legislatures’ excessive use of the preventive
paradigm in the criminal justice system. It has demonstrated the ways in
which these crimes have resulted in the overcriminalization of speech, a
phenomenon that carries a host of unintended consequences not only
from the perspective of the First Amendment but also from the
perspective of substantive criminal law.
The Article has argued that existing theories categorically
excluding all speech acts from First Amendment scrutiny are
responsible for the overcriminalization of speech. Having established
that these theories are flawed, the Article has offered an alternative
doctrinal scheme that would ameliorate the problem. The proposed
analytical framework suggests that all speech crimes would be subject to
strict scrutiny judicial review as well as to internal constraints arising
from criminal law theory.
While subjecting all speech crimes to these constraints is arguably
more protective of speech, this Article nowhere suggests that all
endangerment speech crimes are entitled to broader First Amendment
protection. Admittedly, the First Amendment must yield when speech
threatens grave harm to the nation or to specific individuals. Subjecting
endangerment speech crimes to the proposed constraints would not
result in granting constitutional protection to speech that warrants
criminal sanctions.
Many speech crimes are normatively justified and would pass
constitutional muster, because the government would be able to
demonstrate—based on a balancing process between competing
interests—that the benefits of criminalization outweigh the costs it
imposes on the right to speak. The proposal would therefore not
frustrate the purposes of criminal law—mainly harm prevention and the
deterrence of potentially dangerous conduct. Appropriate risk
management, however, must account for the probability that grave
harm would be inflicted. Applying strict scrutiny analysis to all
endangerment speech crimes ensures that risk-creating speech is
criminalized only once substantial likelihood of grave harm is
established. Additionally, the use of the criminal law is justified only
upon proof of truly dangerous behavior.

